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iSommaire
Nous traitons dans cette thèse les problèmes de modélisation de la dépendance asymétrique et
nonlinéaire avec ses implications sur le choix de portefeuille et la gestion de risque. L’asymétrie de
la dépendance désigne un fait stylisé bien établi selon lequel les marchés sont plus corrélés dans les
mauvais moments que dans les bons. Dans le premier chapitre nous proposons un nouveau modèle
bien adapté à ce phénomène. Nous établissons ensuite un lien entre cette dépendance asymétrique
et la coskewness et montrons comment elle peut expliquer la très faible diversification internationale
observée et la grande tendance a investir dans les actifs moins risques par rapport à ce que le modèle
moyenne-variance prévoit. Le chapitre 2 prouve que le fait d’ignorer cette asymétrie conduit à la
sous-estimation du risque mesuré par la Valeur à Risque (VaR) ou par la Perte moyenne au-delà
de la VaR. Le chapitre 3 restaure la crédibilité de la VaR comme mesure cohérente du risque dans
un contexte pratique.1
Dans le premier Chapitre, nous examinons les problèmes liés à la modélisation du phénomène
d’asymétrie de la dépendance selon lequel les rendements négatifs des actifs financiers sont plus
dépendants que les rendements positifs. Premièrement, nous montrons analytiquement qu’un mod-
èle multivarié du type GARCH ou a changement de régime avec des innovations normales ne peut
pas reproduire la dépendance extrême. Nous proposons un modèle alternatif qui permet de la
dépendance pour les rendements négatifs tout en gardant l’indépendance pour les rendements posi-
tifs. Ce modèle est appliqué aux marchés d’actions et d’obligations internationaux pour analyser
leur structure de dépendance. Il est constitué d’un état normal dans lequel la dépendance est
symétrique et d’un état asymétrique. Les résultats empiriques suggèrent que la dépendance entre
les actifs internationaux du même type est plus large dans les deux états tandis que la dépendance
entre les actions et les obligations reste assez faible même dans le même pays. La volatilité du taux
d’échange apparaît comme un facteur influant sur la dépendance extrême. Nous analysons ensuite
dans le cadre de l’asymétrie, le problème de la faible diversification du portefeuille international
encore appelé le « home bias puzzle ». Les explications principales de ce phénomènes reposent sur
1Le premier chapitre de cette thèse a été écrit en collaboration avec René Garcia. Le troisième chapitre a été écrit
en collaboration avec René Garcia et Eric Renault.
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les deux premiers moments : les coûts de transactions aﬀectent le rendement espéré pendant que
le risque du taux de change et la corrélation entre actifs internationaux aﬀectent la volatilité des
rendements. Ang et Bekaert (2002) utilisent un modèle avec changement d’état markovien pour
analyser l’eﬀet de la corrélation asymétrique sur la diversification internationale et concluent qu’il
est assez faible. Nous proposons ici une explication basée sur le troisième moment est proposée en
montrant qu’il est lié à l’asymétrie de la dépendance. Nous montrons aussi que la même intuition
explique le « flight to safety » : le fait d’aller un peu plus que prévu vers les actifs moins risqués.
Le deuxième chapitre est consacré à l’analyse des implications de l’asymétrie de la dépendance
sur la gestion du risque extrême. Nous montrons qu’en présence de dépendance asymétrique, un
modèle de portefeuille basé sur les modèles classiques de GARCH avec des innovations normales
ou plus généralement symétrique conduit à une sous-estimation de la valeur à risque (VaR) du
portefeuille de même que celle de la perte moyenne au-delà de la VaR. Ces mesures du risque ont
tendance à croître dès lors que les rendement négatifs deviennent de plus en plus dépendants par
rapport aux rendements positifs, les distributions marginales restants inchangées. Pour la précision
dans l’estimation de ces mesures de risques extrêmes en situation de dépendance asymétrique,
nous constatons de manière générale une supériorité de la copule de Gumbel qui prend en compte
l’asymétrie observée dans la structure de dépendance.
Le but du troisième chapitre est de restaurer la crédibilité de la VaR comme mesure cohérente
du risque dans un contexte pratique. Artzner et al (1999) mettent en exergue l’absence de la
sous-additivité de la VaR requise pour être une mesure cohérente du risque. L’idée clef dans ce
chapitre est que si l’épaisseur des queues de distributions est responsable de la violation de la sous-
additivité, une utilisation appropriée de l’information conditionnelle pourrait rendre la VaR plus
rationnelle pour la gestion décentralisée du risque. L’argumentation est triple. Premièrement, dès
lors que les traders sont embauchés sur la base qu’ils possèdent sur leur segment de marché une
information plus riche que le gestionnaire central, Ils doivent simplement respecter les contraintes
prudentielles imposées par celui-ci pour que le contrôle de la VaR décentralisée fonctionne de
façon cohérente. Deuxièmement, dans ce contexte de décentralisation, nous montrons que si le
gestionnaire central a accès ex-post à la composition du portefeuille des traders individuels, il
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pourra récupérer une bonne part de leur information privée. Cette composition du portefeuille
peut être utilisée pour améliorer le backtesting dans le but de vérifier que la contrainte prudentielle
a été respectée par les traders. Finalement, nous montrons que l’épaisseur exigée des queues pour
violer la sous-additivité même pour les petits niveaux de probabilités, induit une situation tellement
extrême qu’elle correspond à une information tellement faible que la perte espérée est infinie. Nous
concluons dont que l’incohérence de la gestion décentralisée par la VaR caractérisée par l’absence
de sous-additivité avec une information assez riche, est une exception et non une règle.
Mots clés: corrélation asymétrique, dépendance asymétrique, copule, dépendance des queues,
GARCH, modèles à changement de régime, finance internationale, valeur à risque, « expected
shortfall », DCC, mesures cohérente de risque, sous-additivité, distributions à queues épaisses,
distributions stables.
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Summary
We address in this dissertation the issue of asymmetric and nonlinear dependence modeling
with its implications for international portfolio choice and risk management. We speak of asymmet-
ric dependence when downside market returns are more dependent than upside market returns, a
well established stylized fact. In the first chapter, we propose a new multivariate model to capture
this fact and establish the link between this asymmetric dependence and coskewness to demonstrate
how it can explain the lack of international diversification, while chapter 2 shows that by ignor-
ing this asymmetry, one underestimates the risk measured with Value at Risk (VaR) or Expected
Shortfall (ES). Chapter 3 restores the credibility of VaR as a coherent risk measure in a practical
context.
In the first chapter, we examine the problems associated with modeling the stylized fact that
asset returns are more dependent in bear markets than in bull markets, called asymmetric depen-
dence. First, we analytically show that a multivariate GARCH or regime switching model with
Gaussian innovations cannot reproduce extreme dependence. We propose an alternative model
which allows tail dependence for lower returns and keeps tail independence for upper returns.
This model is applied to international equity and bond markets to investigate their dependence
structure. It includes one normal regime in which dependence is symmetric and a second regime
characterized by asymmetric dependence. Empirical results suggest that the dependence between
international markets in the same class of assets is large in both regimes, while equity and bond
markets exhibit little dependence, even in the same country. Exchange rate volatility appears to
be related to asymmetric extreme dependence. We also use this model to analyze the lack of in-
ternational portfolio diversification known as the home bias puzzle. The previous explanations for
this phenomenon are relied on the first two moments: transaction costs aﬀect the expected return,
while exchange rate risk and correlation between international assets aﬀect the volatility. Ang and
Bekaert (2002) with a regime changing correlation investigate the eﬀect of asymmetric correlation
on international diversification and conclude that the costs of ignoring regimes are small. We pro-
pose an explanation based on the third moment and using a stochastic dominance argument, we
prove its link with dependence asymmetry. Using the same framework, we show that asymmetric
vdependence amplifies the investment in the bonds, while reducing the investment in equities. This
is another diversification phenomenon known as « flight to safety ».
We analyze in the second chapter the implications of the asymmetric dependence on the man-
agement of extreme risks. We show that in the presence of asymmetric dependence, a portfolio
model based on a multivariate symmetric GARCH with Gaussian or Student-t innovations will
lead to an underestimation of the portfolio value at risk (VaR) or expected shortfall. The latter
will increase when negative returns become more dependent and positive returns less dependent,
while the marginal distributions are left unchanged. In fact, we show that the strong dependence
for low returns increases the downside risk and this additional risk cannot be captured by the
Gaussian distribution. By introducing lower tail dependence, the Student-t distribution corrects
this shortcoming of the Gaussian distribution. However, the symmetric property of the Student-t
means also the same dependence in the upper tail and this will reduce the downside risk. The
risk model that takes into account asymmetric dependence should allow lower tail dependence and
upper tail independence as put forward by Longin and Solnik (2001). The Gumbel copula captures
this asymmetry and shows superiority compared to Gaussian and student-t while combined with
DCC in terms of accuracy of extreme risk measures.
The third chapter addresses the problem of credibility of VaR as a risk measure in a practical
context. As stressed by Artzner et al. (1999), VaR may not possess the subadditivity property
required to be a coherent measure of risk. The key idea of this chapter is that, when tail thickness
is responsible for violation of subadditivity, eliciting proper conditioning information may restore
a VaR rationale for decentralized risk management. The argument is threefold. First, since indi-
vidual traders are hired because they possess richer information on their specific market segment
than senior management, they just have to follow consistently the prudential targets set by senior
management to ensure that decentralized VaR control will work in a coherent way. Second, in this
decentralization context, we show that if senior management has access ex-post to the portfolio
shares of the individual traders, it amounts to recovering some of their private information. These
shares can be used to improve backtesting in order to check that the prudential targets have been
enforced by the traders. Finally, we stress that tail thickness required to violate subadditivity, even
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for small probabilities, remains an extreme situation since it corresponds to such poor conditioning
information that expected loss appears to be infinite. We then conclude that lack of coherency of
decentralized VaR management, that is VaR non-subadditivity at the richest level of information,
should be an exception rather than a rule. .
Key words: asymmetric correlation, asymmetric dependence, copula, tail dependence measures,
GARCH, regime switching models, international finance, Value at Risk, expected shortfall, DCC,
coherent measures of risk, subadditivity, heavy-tail distributions, stable distributions.
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1Introduction générale
La spécification de la distribution des rendements des actifs financiers revêt une importance
capitale dans la gestion de portefeuilles et la gestion du risque. Dès lors, il est impératif de mieux
comprendre le comportement stochastique de ces rendements, leurs caractéristiques et surtout la
structure de leur dépendance.
Des travaux récents notamment de Longin et Solnik (2001) et Ang et Chen (2002) ont révélé
l’existence d’une asymétrie dans la corrélation des rendements des actifs internationaux. En eﬀet,
ils ont constaté une forte corrélation entre des rendements pendant les périodes de détresse et une
faible corrélation entre les rendements lors des booms sur les marchés internationaux. Poussant
leur analyse plus loin au moyen de la théorie des valeurs extrêmes, Longin et Solnik (2001) se sont
rendu compte que la corrélation était nulle pour les rendements extrêmement élevés, alors qu’elle
restait strictement positive pour des rendements extrêmement bas. Bien que la théorie des valeurs
extrêmes permette d’établir de façon précise l’existence de cette asymétrie, elle ne permet ni de la
modéliser dans une distribution globale, ni de déterminer quel modèle est capable de la reproduire.
Le premier chapitre de cette thèse s’attaque d’abord à l’analyse des modèles classiques dans
le but de voir s’ils sont capables ou non de reproduire cette asymétrie dans la dépendance. En
établissant un lien entre la corrélation extrême et la dépendance des queues, nous montrons que les
modèles à changement de régime et les modèles GARCH classiques la reproduisent partiellement ou
ne la reproduisent pas du tout. En fait, les modèles GARCH classiques utilisent la loi normale ou la
loi t de Student qui sont des lois symétriques et de ce fait, bien que la dynamique dans la volatilité
soit capable de changer la dépendance dans les queues elle ne peut modifier la symétrie de cette
dépendance tant que la moyenne reste constante dans le temps. Par contre, comme le constate
Ang et Bekaert (2002), le modèle a changement de régime quant à lui reproduit de l’asymétrie
dans la dépendance, mais cette asymétrie disparait lorsqu’on va plus loin dans les queues. Nous
proposons alors un modèle basé sur les copules qui permet de prendre en compte l’asymétrie dans
la dépendance.
Récemment introduites et aujourd’hui très utilisées dans la modélisation, les copules servent à
2relier les distributions univariées pour en construire des distributions multivariées. Elles définissent
complètement la structure de dépendance et permettent d’aller au delà de la dépendance linéaire
(corrélation) pour prendre en compte les nonlinéarités observées dans les faits.
En utilisant ces outils, nous avons pu construire un modèle à quatre variables, qui nous per-
met non seulement d’analyser le comportement de la corrélation mais aussi la dépendance dans les
queues. Notre modèle comprend deux régimes de dépendance : la dépendance normale (ou Gaussi-
enne) qui est caractérisée par une structure symétrique, et une dépendance dite « rotated Gumbel
» qui présente une asymétrie avec une dépendance dans la queue basse et une indépendance dans la
queue supérieure. Ces deux régimes alternent dans le temps selon un processus dit « markovien »
qui n’est cependant pas observable. L’utilisation des copules nous permet d’autre part de modéliser
séparément les distributions marginales et la structure de la dépendance. Ainsi, nous avons utilisé
les modèles GARCH univariés pour modéliser chaque rendement pris individuellement.
Ce modèle nous a permis d’analyser le comportement des rendements des actions et des oblig-
ations sur les marchés internationaux. Pour cela, deux paires de pays ont été considérées. Le
Canada et les Etats-Unis d’une part, la France et l’Allemagne d’autre part. Les résultats em-
piriques ont révélé une plus forte dépendance internationale entre les actifs du même type par
rapport à la dépendance entre les obligations et les actions même lorsqu’on considère le même
pays. D’autre part, nous avons mis en exergue une relation entre la volatilité du taux d’échange et
l’asymétrie dans la dépendance. Ainsi, la dépendance entre la France et l’Allemagne s’est révélée
très asymétrique avant l’introduction de la monnaie unique européenne (Euro), alors que cette
asymétrie a considérablement diminué après l’introduction de cette monnaie.
L’application de ce modèle dans la diversification internationale de portefeuille a permis d’apporter
un élément d’explication additionnelle aux phénomènes tels que la faible diversification interna-
tionale et la tendance des investisseurs à se rabattre sur les actifs moins risqués comme les oblig-
ations au détriment des actions. L’intuition derrière cette explication est qu’en présence d’une
forte dépendance dans les moments de baisse sur les marchés, les bénéfices liés à la diversification
diminuent du fait que l’eﬀet de la diversification s’estompe au moment ou les investisseurs en ont
3le plus besoin.
Dans le second chapitre, nous analysons les implications de cette asymétrie de la dépendance
sur les mesures de risques extrêmes. Notamment la valeur-à-risque (VaR) qui représente le niveau
de perte maximale encourue sur une période déterminée et avec un seuil de confiance donné. Mais
aussi sur la « Expected Shortfall » (ES) qui représente la perte moyenne lorsqu’elle dépasse la
VaR. Nous montrons que lorsque cette asymétrie n’est pas prise en compte dans un modèle et que
la loi Gaussienne est utilisée comme c’est souvent le cas dans la pratique, ces mesures de risques
extrêmes sont sous-estimées.
Dans une analyse empirique, en utilisant le cadre du modèle DCC de Engle (2002) dans lequel
nous introduisons diﬀérente structure de dépendance et en l’appliquant à des portefeuilles équi-
pondérés d’actions américaines et canadiennes d’une part et d’obligations de ces deux mêmes pays
d’autre part. Nous nous sommes rendu compte que bien que ce cadre général estime assez bien la
VaR au niveau 5% pour toutes les structures de dépendance, il sous-estime cette mesure pour des
niveaux beaucoup plus prudentiels (1%, 0.5%) lorsque l’asymétrie présente dans les données n’est
pas prise en compte. Nous avons obtenu par contre un résultat inattendu bien que explicable pour
ce qui est de l’estimation de la ES. En eﬀet, les modèles de dépendance asymétrique comme la
Gaussienne et la t de Student sous-estiment cette seconde mesure au niveau 5%, bien qu’ils aient
donné plutôt une bonne estimation de la VaR à ce même niveau de couverture. Une explication peu
être liée au fait que si ces distributions génèrent des portefeuilles avec des queues moins épaisses
qu’elles devraient l’être, alors elles auraient tendance à sous-estimer la moyenne dans les queues.
Pour la précision dans l’estimation des mesures de risques extrêmes en situation de dépendance
asymétrique, nous avons constaté de manière générale une supériorité de la copule de Gumbel qui
prend en compte l’asymétrie observée dans la structure de dépendance.
Le problème de la cohérence de la VaR comme mesure de risque est aborde dans le troisième
chapitre. En eﬀet Artzner et al (1999) ont formulé quatre propriétés qu’une mesure de risque
doit satisfaire pour être considérée comme cohérente. L’une de ses propriétés notamment la sous-
additivité n’est pas toujours vérifiée par la VaR. La pertinence de cette propriété repose sur le fait
4que la diversification est considérée comme un moyen de réduction du risque, cependant pour que
ce soit le cas, il faudrait que la mesure de risque soit sous-additive. L’idée clef de notre démarche est
que si l’épaisseur des queues de distributions est responsable de la violation de la sous-additivité,
une utilisation appropriée de l’information conditionnelle pourrait rendre la VaR plus rationnelle
pour la gestion décentralisée du risque. Nous développons une triple argumentation. Premièrement,
partant du fait que les traders possèdent sur leur segment de marché une information dite privée
plus riche que le gestionnaire central, Ils doivent simplement respecter les contraintes prudentielles
imposées par celui-ci pour que le contrôle de la VaR décentralisée fonctionne de façon cohérente.
Nous montrons par la suite, que dans ce contexte de décentralisation, si le gestionnaire central
a accès ex-post à la composition du portefeuille des traders individuels, il pourra récupérer une
bonne part de leur information privée. Cette composition du portefeuille peut être utilisée pour
améliorer le backtesting dans le but de vérifier que la contrainte prudentielle a été respectée par
les traders. Finalement, en utilisant les distributions à queues épaisses telles que les lois stables
et les lois de type Pareto, nous montrons que l’épaisseur exigée des queues pour violer la sous-
additivité même pour les petits niveaux de probabilités, induit une situation tellement extrême
qu’elle correspond à une information tellement faible que la perte espérée est infinie. Nous concluons
dont que l’incohérence de la gestion décentralisée par la VaR caractérisée par l’absence de sous-
additivité avec une information assez riche, est une exception et non une règle, d’autant plus que
dans la pratique, la moyenne conditionnelle ou inconditionnelle est en général supposée finie. En
d’autres termes, sans remettre en cause la validité mathématique du résultat selon lequel la VaR
peut dans certaines conditions violer la sous-additivité, nous recentrons le débat sur le plan pratique
en montrant qu’elle est cohérente non seulement dans le cadre des lois normales, mais aussi dans
un contexte plus général des distributions fréquemment utilisées dans la modélisation des valeurs
extrêmes telles que les lois de type Pareto et les lois stables tant que la moyenne est finie.
5.
Chapter 1
Dependence Structure and Extreme Comovements in
International Equity and Bond Markets with Portfolio
Diversification Eﬀects
61. Introduction
Negative returns are more dependent than positive returns in financial markets, especially in
international asset markets. This phenomenon known as asymmetric dependence has been reported
by many previous studies including Erb et al (1994), Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Bekaert
(2002), Ang and Chen (2002), Das and Uppal (2003), Patton (2004), and references therein. This
asymmetric dependence has important implications for portfolio choice and risk management.1
However, measuring and modeling asymmetric dependence remains a challenge.
Previous studies commonly use simple, dynamic or exceedance correlation to investigate the
dependence structure between financial returns.2 These measures are adequate for linear and
especially when the returns are jointly normal or conditionally normal, a property which is rarely
verified empirically, especially at high frequency. Boyer et al (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
remark that correlations estimated conditionally on high or low returns or volatility suﬀer from
some conditioning bias. Correlation asymmetry may therefore appear spuriously if these biases
are not accounted for. To avoid these problems, Longin and Solnik (2001) use extreme value
theory (EVT) by focusing on the asymptotic value of exceedance correlation.3 The benefit of
EVT resides in the fact that the asymptotic result holds regardless of the whole distribution of
returns. However, as emphasized by Longin and Solnik (2001), EVT cannot help to determine if a
given return-generating process is able to reproduce the extreme asymmetric exceedance correlation
observed in the data.
1Patton (2004) finds that the knowledge of asymmetric dependence leads to gains that are economically significant,
while Ang and Bekaert (2002), in a regime switching setup, argue that the costs of ignoring the diﬀerence between
regimes of high and low dependence are small, but increase with the possibility to invest in a risk-free asset.
2The exceedance correlation between two series of returns is defined as the correlation for a sub-sample in which
the returns of both series are simultaneously lower (or greater) than the corresponding thresholds θ1 and θ2. Formally,
exceedance correlation of variables X and Y at thresholds θ1 and θ2 is expressed by
Ex_corr (Y,X; θ1, θ2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
corr (X,Y |X ≤ θ1, Y ≤ θ2 ) , for θ1 ≤ 0 and θ2 ≤ 0
corr (X,Y |X ≥ θ1, Y ≥ θ2 ) , for θ1 ≥ 0 and θ2 ≥ 0
. Longin and Solnik (2001) use
θ1 = θ2 = θ, while Ang and Chen (2002) use θ1 = (1 + θ)X and θ2 = (1 + θ)Y , where X and Y are the means of Y
and X respectively.
3Extreme Value Theory (EVT) is used to characterize the distribution of a variable conditionally to the fact that
its values are beyond a threshold, and the asymptotic distribution is obtained when this threshold tends to infinity.
7This paper provides a first solution to this shortcoming. By using the concept of tail depen-
dence instead of exceedance corelation, we are able to investigate which model can reproduce these
empirical facts. The tail dependence coeﬃcient can be seen as the probability of the worst event in
one market given that the worst event occurs in another market. Contrary to exceedance correla-
tion, the estimation of the tail dependence coeﬃcient is not subject to the problem of choosing an
appropriate threshold and the use of extreme value distributions such as the Pareto distribution.
Another diﬀerence is that tail dependence is completely defined by the dependence structure and
is not aﬀected by variations in marginal distributions.
Thanks to the tail dependence formulation of asymptotic dependence, we establish important
analytical results. We show that the multivariate GARCH or regime switching (RS) models with
Gaussian innovations that have been used to address asymmetric dependence issues (see Ang and
Bekaert, 2002, Ang and Chen, 2002, and Patton, 2004) cannot reproduce an asymptotic exceedance
correlation. The key point is that these classes of models can be seen as mixtures of symmetric
distributions and cannot produce asymptotically an asymmetric dependence. Of course this does
not mean that at finite distance a mixture of these classes cannot produce some asymmetric depen-
dence. The RS model of Ang and Chen (2002) oﬀers a good example. However, the asymmetry put
forward disappears asymptotically. When we go far in the tails, we obtain a similar dependence for
the upper and lower tails. In RS models, extreme positive (or negative) returns are independent.
Moreover, the asymmetry in this RS model comes from the asymmetry created in the marginal
distributions with regime switching in the mean. Hence it is not separable from the marginal
asymmetry or skewness. 4
We propose an alternative model based on copulas that allows tail dependence for lower returns
and keeps tail independence for upper returns as suggested by the findings of Longin and Solnik
(2001). We apply this model to international equity and bond markets to investigate their depen-
dence structure. It includes one normal regime in which dependence is symmetric and a second
4Ang and Chen (2002) conclude that even if regime-switching models perform best in explaining the amount of
correlation asymmetry reflected in the data, these models still leave a significant amount of correlation asymmetry
in the data unexplained.
8regime characterized by asymmetric dependence. We separately analyze dependence between the
two leading markets in North-America (US and Canada) and two major markets of the Euro zone
(France and Germany). We further investigate the implications of this asymmetric dependence on
international portfolio choice especially its ability to explain the home bias investment and flight
to safety.
Copulas are functions that build multivariate distribution functions from their unidimensional
marginal distributions. The theory of this useful tool dates back to Sklar (1959) and a clear pre-
sentation can be found in Nelsen (1999). Well designed to analyze nonlinear dependence, copulas
were initially used by statisticians for nonparametric estimation and measure of dependence of ran-
dom variables (see Genest and Rivest, 1993 and references therein). Their application to financial
and economic problems is a new and fast-growing field of interest. Here, the use of this concept
is essentially motivated by the fact that it allows to separate the features due to each marginal
distribution from the dependence eﬀect between all variables. This helps overcoming the curse
of dimensionality associated with the estimation of models with several variables. For example,
in multivariate GARCH models, the estimation becomes intractable when the number of series
being modeled is high. The CCC of Bollerslev (1990), the DCC of Engle (2002), and the RSDC of
Pelletier (2004) deal with this problem by separating the variance-covariance matrix in two parts,
one part for the univariate variances of the diﬀerent marginal distributions, another part for the
correlation coeﬃcients. This separation allows them to estimate the model in two steps. In the
first step, they estimate the marginal parameters and use them in the estimation of the correlation
parameters in a second step. Copulas oﬀer a tool to generalize this separation while extending the
linear concept of correlation to nonlinear dependence.
The empirical investigation shows that the dependence between equities and bonds is low even
in the same country, while the dependence between international assets of the same type is large in
both regimes. Extreme dependence appears across countries in both the bond and equity markets,
but it is nonexistent across the bond and the equity markets, even in the same country. Another
finding is that the correlation in the normal regime diﬀers from the unconditional correlation.
9This may be due to nonlinear dependence of international returns characterized by the presence
of extreme dependence that is absent in the tail of a multivariate normal distribution. Exchange
rate volatility seems to be a factor contributing to asymmetric dependence. With the introduction
of a fixed exchange rate the dependence between France and Germany becomes less asymmetric
and more normal than before. High exchange rate volatility is associated with a high level of
asymmetry. These results are consistent with those of Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2003) who
find an increase in correlation after the introduction of the Euro currency.
We use this model in a simple portfolio choice framework with a CRRA utility function in-
volving the same categories of assets. We explore the implications in terms of diversification, both
internationally (the home bias phenomenon) and domestically (the flight to safety phenomenon).
The main result is that asymmetric dependence increases the downside risk and therefore, very
risk averse investors tend to switch toward less risky assets when downside dependence increases.
So, for a Canadian investor who holds US and Canadian bonds and equities, the share invested
in Canada increases with the asymmetric dependence since the Canadian market in our sample is
less risky. A similar behavior is observed for the bond and equity trade-oﬀ. In the asymmetric
dependence regime, the very risk averse agent increases the fraction of its wealth in bonds.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reformulates the empirical facts about
exceedance correlation in terms of tail dependence and shows how classical GARCH or regime
switching models fail to capture these facts. In section 3 we develop a model with two regimes
that clearly disentangles dependence from marginal distributional features and allows asymmetry
in extreme dependence. As a result, we obtain a model with four variables that features asymmetry
and a flexible dependence structure. Empirical evidence on the dependence structure is examined
in section 4, while section 5 analyses the implications of asymmetric dependence on international
and domestic diversification. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
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2. Extreme Asymmetric Dependence and Modeling Issues
In this section we present empirical facts about exceedance correlation in international equity
market returns put forward by Longin and Solnik (2001) and the related literature. We next
argue that these facts can be equivalently reformulated in terms of tail dependence. The latter
formulation will allow us to explain why classical return-generating processes such as GARCH
and regime switching models based on a multivariate normal distribution fail to reproduce these
empirical facts.
2.1 Empirical Facts
Longin and Solnik (2001) investigate the structure of correlation between various equity markets in
extreme situations. Their main finding is that equity returns exhibit a high correlation in extreme
bear markets and no correlation in extreme bull periods. They arrive at this conclusion by testing
the equality of exceedance correlations, one obtained under a joint normality assumption and the
other one computed using EVT. For the latter distribution, they model the marginal distributions
of equity index returns with a generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) and capture dependence
through a logistic function. Their analysis brings forward two important facts. First, there exists
asymmetry in exceedance correlation, that is large negative returns are more correlated than large
positive returns. Ang and Chen (2002) who develop a test statistic based on the diﬀerence between
exceedance correlations computed from the data and those obtained from a given model.5 They
find as in Ang and Bekaert (2002) that regime switching models can reproduce the above fact.
However, in their regime switching model, it is diﬃcult to separate asymmetric dependence from
marginal asymmetries or skewness in the marginal distributions.
5Ang and Chen (2002) define a test statistic H =

NS
i=1
1
N (ρ (ϑi)− eρ (ϑi))
2
1/2
which is the distance between ex-
ceedance correlations obtained from the normal distribution (ρ (ϑ1) , ..., ρ (ϑN )) and exceedance correlations estimated
from the data (eρ (ϑ1) , ...,eρ (ϑN )) for a set of N selected thresholds {ϑ1, ..., ϑN} . In the same way they define H−
and H+ by considering negative points for H− and nonnegative points for H+ such that H2 =

H−
2
+

H+
2.
They can therefore conclude to asymmetry if H− diﬀers from H+. Their results depend on the choice of the set of
thresholds and can only account for asymmetry at finite distance but not asymptotically.
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The second fact relates to exceedance correlation in the limit. Longin and Solnik find that
exceedance correlation is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero for very large negative returns
and not diﬀerent from zero for very large positive returns.
We illustrate these facts and the capacity of models to reproduce them in Figure 1 with US
and Canadian returns. We specify thresholds in term of quantiles: θ1 = F−1X (α) and θ2 = F
−1
Y (α)
where FX and FY are the cumulative distribution functions of Y and X respectively. Follow-
ing Longin and Solnik (2001) and Ang and Chen (2002) exceedance correlations are symmetric if
Ex_corr (Y,X; θ1) = Ex_corr (Y,X; θ2) ;α ∈ (0, 1). Correlations of return exceedances exhibit
the typical shape put forward in Longin and Solnik (2001) for the US equity market with various
European equity markets. For the models, we chose to retain the multivariate normal, as a bench-
mark case to show that correlations go to zero as we move further in the tails, as well a normal
regime switching model, as in Ang and Chen (2002). The last model produces some asymmetry
in correlations for positive and negative returns but not nearly as much as in the data. We also
exhibit the exceedance correlations estimated from the model used by Longin and Solnik (2001).
It is evidently much closer to the data. Finally, we also report the correlations obtained from a
rotated Gumbel copula for the dependence function (see Appendix for a definition), with Gaussian
marginal distributions. The graph is very close to the Longin and Solnik (2001) one.
Since asymptotic exceedance correlation is zero for both sides of a bivariate normal distribution,
Longin and Solnik (2001) interpreted these findings as rejection of normality for large negative
returns and non-rejection for large positive returns. In the conclusion of their article, Longin
and Solnik stress that their approach has the disavantage of not explicitly specifying the class of
return-generating processes that fail to reproduce these two facts.
We provide a first answer to this concern by characterizing some classes of models which cannot
reproduce these asymmetries in extreme dependence. The diﬃculty in telling which model can
reproduce these facts is the lack of analytical expressions for the asymptotic exceedance correlation
and its intractability even for classical models such as Gaussian GARCH or regime switching models.
In order to investigate this issue, we introduce the concept of tail dependence.
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2.2 Tail Dependence
To measure the dependence between an extreme event on one market and a similar event on another
market, we define two dependence functions one for the lower tail and one for the upper tail, with
their corresponding asymptotic tail dependence coeﬃcients. For two random variables X and Y
with cumulative distribution functions FX and FY respectively, we call the lower tail dependence
function (TDF) the conditional probability τL (α) ≡ Pr
£
X ≤ F−1X (α)
¯¯
Y ≤ F−1Y (α)
¤
and similarly,
the upper tail dependence function is τU (α) ≡ Pr
£
X ≥ F−1X (1− α)
¯¯
Y ≥ F−1Y (1− α)
¤
for α ∈
(0, 1/2].6 The tail dependence coeﬃcient (TDC) is simply the limit (when it exists) of this function
when α tends to zero. More precisely lower TDC is τL = lim
α→0
τL (α) and upper TDC is τU =
lim
α→0
τU (α). As in the case of joint normality, we have lower tail-independence when τL = 0 and
upper tail-independence for τU = 0.
Compared to exceedance correlation used by Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Chen (2002),
Ang and Bekaert (2002), and Patton (2004), one of the advantages of TDF and corresponding TDCs
is their invariance to modifications of marginal distributions that do not aﬀect the dependence
structure. Figure 2 gives an illustration of this invariance. We simulate a bivariate Gaussian
distribution N (0, Iρ) , where Iρ is the two dimensional matrix with standard deviations equal to
one in all elements of the diagonal and ρ = 0.5 is the correlation coeﬃcient outside the diagonal
elements. Both exceedance correlation and tail dependence measures show a symmetric behavior
of dependence in extreme returns. However, when we replace one of the marginal distributions
N (0, 1) by a mixture of normals one N (0, 1) and one N (4, 4) with equal weights and let the
other marginal distribution and the dependence structure unchanged, the TDF remains the same
while the exceedance correlation is aﬀected. In fact, the correlation coeﬃcient and the exceedance
correlation are a function of the dependence structure and of the marginal distributions while the tail
dependence is a sole function of the dependence structure, regardless of the marginal distributions.
6 In the literature (see Rodriguez, 2004 and references therein), only the limit of this function is considered.
Here, we define the TDF for every α ∈ (0, 1over2] to make a comparison with conditional correlation, which is
also a function of a threshold. The tail dependence measure is also related to the concept of lower (upper) orthant
dependence concept (see Denuit and Scaillet, 2004).
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Another disadvantage of exceedance correlation is that asymptotic exceedance correlation cannot
be estimated without sample bias since fewer data points are available when we move further into
the tails of the distribution. Longin and Solnik (2001) determine by simulation an optimal threshold
and use the subsample beyond this threshold to estimate the asymptotic exceedance correlation.
But this shortcoming does not compromise the results of Longin and Solnik (2001) since they choose
diﬀerent levels of threshold and still obtain the same result. With tail dependence, the estimation
is done using all data points in the sample and the estimators of the tail coeﬃcients are unbiased.
By observing that for the logistic function used by Longin and Solnik (2001), the zero value for
the asymptotic correlation coeﬃcient is exactly equivalent to tail independence, we can reformulate
their asymptotic result as follow : lower extreme returns are tail-dependent, while upper extreme
returns are tail-independent.7
This reformulation presents at least two main advantages. Compared to exceedance correlation,
the tail dependence coeﬃcient is generally easier to compute and analytical expressions can be
obtained for almost all distributions. This is not the case for exceedance correlation even for
usual distributions. Moreover, we can easily derive the tail dependence of a mixture from the tail
dependence of the diﬀerent components of the mixture. The last property will be used below to
investigate which model can or cannot reproduce the results of Longin and Solnik (2001).
2.3 Why classical multivariate GARCH and RS model cannot reproduce as-
ymptotic asymmetries?
Ang and Chen (2002) and Ang and Bekaert (2002) try to reproduce asymmetric correlations facts
with classical models such as GARCH and RS based on a multivariate normal distribution. After
examining a number of models, they found that GARCH with constant correlation and fairly
asymmetric GARCH cannot reproduce the asymmetric correlations documented by Longin and
Solnik. However, they found that a RS model with Gaussian innovations is better at reproducing
7For the logistic function with parameter α, the correlation coeﬃcient of extremes is 1−α2 (see Longin and Solnik,
2001). We find that the upper tail dependence coeﬃcient is 2− 2α. Then, both coeﬃcients are zero when α equals 1
and diﬀerent from zero when α is diﬀerent from 1.
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asymmetries in exceedance correlation. They clearly reproduce asymmetric correlations at finite
distance, however the asymptotic asymmetric dependence put forward in Longin and Solnik (2001).
Their finite distance asymmetric correlation comes from the asymmetries produced in the marginal
distributions with a regime switching in means.8 Therefore it becomes diﬃcult to distinguish
asymmetries in dependence from asymmetry in marginal distributions.
By reinterpreting Longin and Solnik (2001) results in term of TDC instead of asymptotic ex-
ceedance correlation, we show analytically that all these models cannot reproduce asymptotic asym-
metry even if some can reproduce finite distance asymmetry. These results are extended to the
rejection of more general classes of return-generating processes. The key point of this result is the
fact that many classes of models including Gaussian(or Student) GARCH and RS can be seen as
mixtures of symmetric distributions. We establish the following result.
Proposition 2.1:
(i) Any GARCH model with constant mean and symmetric conditional distribution has a sym-
metric unconditional distribution and hence has a symmetric TDC.
(ii) If the conditional distribution of a RS model has a zero TDC, then the unconditional dis-
tribution also has a zero TDC.
(iii) From a multivariate distribution with symmetric TDC, it is impossible to construct an
asymmetric TDC with a mixture procedure (as GARCH, RS or any other) by keeping all marginal
distributions unchanged across mixture components.
Proof : see Appendix A.
This proposition allows us to argue that the classical GARCH or RS models cannot reproduce
asymmetries in asymptotic tail dependence. Therefore, the classical GARCH models (BEKK, CCC
8Ang and Bekaert (2002) note that the ability of RS model (compared to GARCH model) to reproduce asym-
metries, derives from the fact that it accounts the persistence in both first and second moments while the GARCH
accounts this persistence only in second moments. We give analytical arguments to this intuition.
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or DCC) with constant mean can be seen as a mixture of symmetric distributions with the same first
moments and therefore exhibit a symmetric tail dependence function as well as a symmetric TDC.9
When the mean becomes time-varying as in the GARCH-M model the unconditional distribution
can allow asymmetry in correlation (Ang and Chen, 2002), but this asymmetry comes from the
mixture of the marginal distributions. The resulting skewness cannot be completely disentangled
from the asymmetric correlation, since correlations are aﬀected by marginal changes. Similarly, the
classical RS model with Gaussian innovations is a discrete mixture of normal distributions which
has a TDC equal to zero on both sides. Therefore, by (ii) we argue that both its TDCs are zero.
However, at finite distance, when the mean changes with regimes, the exceedance correlation is
not symmetric. This asymmetry is found by Ang and Chen (2002) and Ang and Bekaert (2002)
in their RS model, but it disappears asymptotically and it comes from the asymmetry created in
the marginal distributions by regime switching in means. Hence, the asymmetries in correlation
are not separable from the marginal asymmetry, exactly like in the GARCH-M case. The part
(iii) of proposition 2.1 extends this intuition in terms of more general multivariate mixture models
based on symmetric innovations. Actually when the marginal distributions are the same across all
symmetric TDC components of a mixture, it is impossible to create asymmetry in TDCs.
Two relevant questions arise from the above discussion. First, how can we separate the mar-
ginal asymmetries from the asymmetry in dependence? Second, how can we account not only for
asymmetries at finite distance but also for asymptotic dependence? In the next section, we propose
a flexible model based on copulas that addresses these two issues.
3. A Copula Model for asymmetric dependence
Our model aims at capturing the type of asymmetric dependence found in international equity
returns. Our discussion in the last section showed that it is important to disentangle the marginal
9The BEKK proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) is the straightforward generalization of the GARCH model to
a multivariate case which guarantees positive definiteness of the conditional variance-covariance matrix. In the CCC
model proposed by Bollerslev (1990) the conditional variance-covariance matrix is assumed constant, while in the
DCC of Engle (2002) this matrix is dynamic.
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distributions from the dependence structure. Therefore, we need to allow for asymmetry in tail
dependence, regardless of the possible marginal asymmetry or skewness. Copulas, also known as
dependence functions, are an adequate tool to achieve this aim.
3.1 Disentangling the marginal distributions from dependence with copulas
Estimation of multivariate models is diﬃcult because of the large number of parameters involved.
Multivariate GARCHmodels are a good example since the estimation becomes intractable when the
number of series being modeled is high. The CCC of Bollerslev (1990), the DCC of Engle (2002),
and the RSDC of Pelletier (2004) deal with this problem by separating the variance-covariance
matrix into two parts, one for the univariate variances of the diﬀerent marginal distributions, the
other for the correlation coeﬃcients. This separation allows them to estimate the model in two
steps. In the first step, they estimate the marginal parameters and use them in the estimation of
the correlation parameters in a second step. Copulas oﬀer a tool to generalize this separation while
extending the linear concept of correlation to nonlinear dependence.
Copulas are functions that build multivariate distribution functions from their unidimensional
margins. Let X ≡ (X1, ...,Xn) be a vector of n univariate variables. Denoting F the joint n-
dimensional distribution function and F1, ..., Fn the respective margins of X1, ...,Xn. Then the
Sklar theorem states that there exists a function C called copula which joins F to F1, ..., Fn as
follows.10
F (x1, ..., xn) = C (F1 (x1) , ..., Fn (xn)) (3.1)
This relation can be expressed in term of densities by diﬀerentiating with respect to all argu-
ments. We can therefore write (2.1) equivalently as
f (x1, ..., xn) = c (F1 (x1) , ..., Fn (xn))×
nY
i=1
fi (xi) (3.2)
where f represents the joint density function of the n-dimensional variable X and fi the density
function of the variable Xi for i = 1, ..., n. The copula density function is naturally defined by
10See Nelsen (1999) for a general presentation. Note that if Fi is continuous for any i = 1, ..., n then the copula C
is unique.
17
c (u1, ..., un) ≡ ∂
n
∂u1...∂unC (u1, ..., un). Writing the joint distribution density in the above form,
we understand why it can be said that copula contains all information about the dependence
structure.11
We now suppose that our joint distribution function is parametric and we separate the marginal
parameters from the copula parameters. So the relation (3.2) can be expressed as:
f (x1, ..., xn; δ, θ) = c (u1, ..., un; θ)×
nY
i=1
fi (xi; δi) ; (3.3)
ui = Fi (xi; δi) for i = 1, ..., n
where δ = (δ1, ..., δn) are the parameters of the diﬀerent margins and θ denotes the vector of all
parameters that describe dependence through the copula. Therefore, copulas oﬀer a way to separate
margins from the dependence structure and to build more flexible multivariate distributions.
More recent work allow some dynamics in dependence. In a bivariate context, Rodriguez (2004)
introduces regime switching in both theparameters of marginal distributions and the copula func-
tion.12 Ang and Bekaert (2002; 2004) allow all parameters of the multivariate normal distribution
to change with the regime. The extension of these models to a large number of series faces the
above-mentioned curse of dimensionality. Since the switching variable is present in both the mar-
gins and the dependence function, separation of the likelihood function into two parts is not possible
and the two-step estimation cannot be performed. Pelletier (2004) uses the same separation as in
the CCC or DCC and introduces the regime switching variable only in the correlation coeﬃcients.
By doing so, he can proceed with the two-step procedure to estimate the model while limiting the
number of parameters to be estimated.13 We carry out a similar idea but for nonlinear dependence.
Therefore, we separate the modeling of marginal distributions from the modeling of dependence
11The tail dependence coeﬃcients are easily defined through copula as τL = lim
α→0
C (α,α)
α
and τU =
lim
α→0
2α− 1 + C (1− α, 1− α)
α
12The models proposed by Rodriguez (2004) in his analysis of contagion can reproduce asymmetric dependence
but it cannot distinguish between skewness and asymmetry in the dependence structure. In fact, a change in regime
produces both skewness and asymmetric dependence, two diﬀerent features that must be characterized separately.
13Since Pelletier (2004) uses the normal distribution with constant mean, the resulting unconditional distribution
is symmetric and cannot reproduce asymmetric dependence.
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by using univariate GARCH models for the marginal distributions and introducing changes in
regime in the copula dependence structure. The pattern of the model with four variables (two
countries, two markets in our following application) is illustrated in Figure 3a.
3.2 Specification of the Marginal Distributions
For marginal distributions, we use a M-GARCH (1,1) model similar to Heston-Nandi (2000):
xi,t = μi + λiσ
2
i,t + σi,tzi,t; zi,t ∼ N (0, 1) ; i = 1, · · · , 4 (3.4)
σ2i,t = ωi + βiσ
2
i,t−1 + αi (zi,t−1 − γiσi,t−1)2 . (3.5)
The variables x1,t and x2,t represent the log returns of equities and bonds respectively for the
first country while x3,t and x4,t are the corresponding series for the second country; σ2i,t denotes
the conditional variance of xi,t, λi can be interpreted as the price of risk and γi captures potential
asymmetries in the volatility eﬀect.14 In the Heston-Nandi (2000) interpretation, μi represents
the interest rate.15 The parameters of the marginal distributions are grouped into one vector
δ ≡ (δ1, · · · , δ4) , with δi = (μi, λi, ωi, βi, αi, γi).
3.3 Specification of the Dependence Structure
Our dependence model is characterized by two regimes, one Gaussian regime in which the de-
pendence is symmetric (CN) and a second regime that can capture the asymmetry in extreme
dependence (CA). The conditional copula is given by:
C
¡
u1,t, ..., u4,t; ρN , ρA |st
¢
= stCN
¡
u1,t, ..., u4,t; ρN
¢
+ (1− st)CA
¡
u1,t, ..., u4,t; ρA
¢
, (3.6)
where ui,t = Fit (xi,t; δi), with Fit denoting the conditional cumulative distribution function of
xi,t given the past observations. The variable st follows a Markov chain with a time-invarying
14The condition βi + αiγ
2
i < 1 is suﬃcient to have the stationarity of the process xi,t with finite unconditional
mean and variance (see Heston and Nandi, 2000).
15Here we keep μi as a free parameter to give more flexibility to our model.
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transitional probability matrix
M =
⎛
⎝ P 1− P
1−Q Q
⎞
⎠ ;P = Pr (st = 1 |st−1 = 1) and Q = Pr (st = 0 |st−1 = 0 ) (3.7)
The normal regime (st = 1) corresponds to the symmetric regime where the conditional joint
normality can be supported and the asymmetric regime (st = 0) corresponds to the asymmetric
regime in which markets are strongly more dependent for large asymptotic negative returns than
for large positive returns.
The Gaussian copula CN is defined straightforwardly by (2.1) where the joint distribution
F = ΦρN is the 4-dimensional normal cumulative distribution function with all diagonal elements
of the covariance matrix equal to one, i.e. CN
¡
u1, ..., u4; ρN
¢
= ΦρN
¡
Φ−1 (u1) , ...,Φ−1 (u4)
¢
, where
Φ is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function.
The asymmetric components of the copula are illustrated in figure 3b. The first one is char-
acterized by independence between the two countries, but possibly extreme dependence between
equities and bonds for each country. The second one is characterized by independence between
equity and bond markets but allows for extreme dependence between equity returns and bond
returns separately. The third one allows for possible extreme dependence between bonds in one
country and equities in another country but supposes independence for the rest.
Formally the asymmetric copula is the mixture of these three components and is expressed as
follows
CA
¡
u1, ..., u4; ρA
¢
≡ π1CGS
¡
u1, u2; τL1
¢× CGS ¡u3, u4; τL2 ¢
+π2CGS
¡
u1, u3; τL3
¢×CGS ¡u2, u4; τL4 ¢
+(1− π1 − π2)CGS
¡
u1, u4; τL5
¢× CGS ¡u2, u3; τL6 ¢
(3.8)
with ρA =
¡
π1, π2, τL1 , τ
L
2 , τ
L
3 , τ
L
4 , τ
L
5 , τ
L
6
¢
, and the bivariate component is the Gumbel survival
copula given by
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CGS
¡
u, v; τL
¢
= u+ v − 1 + exp
∙
−
³
(− log (1− u))θ(τL) + (− log (1− v))θ(τL)
´1/θ(τL)¸
, (3.9)
where θ
¡
τL
¢
=
log (2)
log (2− τL) , τ
L ∈ [0, 1) is the lower TDC and the upper TDC is zero.16
One can notice that our asymmetric copula specification assumes some constraints in the de-
pendence structure. For three diﬀerent couples from diﬀerent components of this copula, the sum
of their TDC is lower than one.17 Without any constraints this sum may reach 3. Such constraints
are dictated by some copula limitations.18 A major problem in multivariate distributions’ con-
struction today and perhaps the most important open question concerning copulas as mentioned
by Nelsen (1999, page 86) is how to construct multivariate copulas with specific bivariate marginal
distributions. A theorem by Genest et al. (1995) states that it is not always possible to construct
multivariate copulas with given bivariate margins. Therefore, even if in the bivariate case we can
have a nice asymmetric copula with lower tail dependence and upper tail independence as Longin
and Solnik (2001) suggest, some problems remain when we contemplate more than two series. Most
existing asymmetric tail dependent copulas are in the family of archimedian copulas and the usual
straightforward generalization in multivariate copulas constrains all bivariate marginal copulas to
be the same. This is clearly not admissible in the context of our analysis. In the above model, we
allow each of the six couples of interest to have diﬀerent levels of lower TDC. As CA is constructed,
it is easy to check that it is a copula since each component of the mixture is a copula and the
mixture of copulas is a copula.19
It is important to notice that, in this model, the labeling of each regime is defined ex-ante. The
16The Longin and Solnik (2001) result implies that lower tails are dependent while upper tails are independent.
Hence, the Gumbel survival copula is designed to model this feature since it has this tail dependence structure.
17For example, the TDC between bonds and equities in the first country is π1τL1 , between equities of two countries
π2τL3 , and between equities in the first country and bonds in the second country (1− π1 − π2) τL5 . Therefore, the
sum is π1τL1 + π2τL3 + (1− π1 − π2) τL5 ≤ 1, since τL1 ≤ 1, τL3 ≤ 1, and τL5 ≤ 1.
18This model can be generalized in the same way to a copula of any dimension. The same type of restrictions are
applied, but we obtain a copula with a more flexible dependence structure.
19A copula can be seen as the cdf of a multidimensional variable with uniform [0, 1] margins. If we consider two
bivariate independent variables with uniform margins the copula linking the four variables is simply the product of
the corresponding bivariate copulas. Hence, such a product is always a copula.
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normal regime (st = 1) corresponds to the symmetric regime where the conditional joint normality
can be supported and the asymmetric regime (st = 0) corresponds to the asymmetric regime
in which markets are strongly more dependent for large negative returns than for large positive
returns.
3.4 An adapted parsimonious model
Given our application, we impose an additional constraint: π1+π2 = 1. This means that we neglect
the asymmetric cross-dependence between equities in one country and bonds in another country,
which seems like an economically reasonable assumption given that we maintain cross-dependence
through the normal regime. The mixed copula becomes.
CA
¡
u1, ..., u4; ρA
¢
≡ πCGS
¡
u1, u2; τL1
¢×CGS ¡u3, u4; τL2 ¢
+(1− π)CGS
¡
u1, u3; τL3
¢×CGS ¡u2, u4; τL4 ¢
(3.10)
Therefore, the asymmetry copula is now characterized by just five parameters ρA =
¡
π, τL1 , τ
L
2 , τ
L
3 , τ
L
4
¢
.
3.5 Estimation
As already mentioned, our structure allows for a two-step estimation procedure. The likelihood
function must be evaluated unconditionally to the unobservable regime variable st and decomposed
in two parts. Let us denote the sample of observed data by XT = {X1, · · · ,XT} where Xt ≡
{x1,t, · · · , x4,t}. The log likelihood function is given by:
L (δ, θ;XT ) =
TX
t=1
log f
¡
Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1
¢
(3.11)
where Xt−1 = {X1, ...Xt−1} and θ is a vector including the parameters of the copula and the
transition matrix. Hamilton (1989) describes a procedure to perform this type of evaluation20.
With ξt = (st, 1− st)0 and denoting
20A general presentation can be found in Hamilton (1994, chapter 22).
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ηt =
⎡
⎣ f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st = 1)
f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st = 0)
⎤
⎦ (3.12)
the density function conditionally to the regime variable st and the past returns can be written as:
f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st) = ξ0tηt (3.13)
Since st (or ξt) is unobservable, we integrate on st and obtain the unconditional density function:
f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1) = Pr
£
st = 1|Xt−1; δ, θ
¤× f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st = 1)
+Pr
£
st = 0|Xt−1; δ, θ
¤× f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st = 0) (3.14)
The conditional probabilities of being in diﬀerent regimes at time t conditional on observations
up to time t − 1, denoted by bξt|t−1 ≡(Pr £st = 1|Xt−1; δ, θ¤, Pr £st = 0|Xt−1; δ, θ¤)0, are computed
through the Hamilton filter. Starting with the initial value bξ1|0, the optimal inference and forecast
for each date in the sample is given by the iterative equations:
bξt/t = hbξ0t|t−1ηti−1 ³bξt|t−1 ¯ ηt´ (3.15)bξt+1/t = M 0.bξt|t (3.16)
where ¯ denotes element-by-element multiplication. Finally, the unconditional density can be
evaluated with the observed data as f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1) = bξ0t|t−1ηt and the log likelihood becomes:
L (δ, θ;XT ) =
TX
t=1
log
³bξ0t|t−1ηt´ (3.17)
To perform the two-step procedure, we decompose the log likelihood function into two parts:
the first part includes the likelihood functions of all margins, while the second part represents the
likelihood function of the copula.
Proposition 3.2 (Decomposition of the log likelihood function) The log likelihood func-
tion can be decomposed into two parts including the margins and the copula
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L (δ, θ;XT ) =
4X
i=1
Li
¡
δi;Xi,T
¢
+ LC (δ, θ;XT ) (3.18)
where
Xi,t = {xi,1, ..., xi,t} ;
Li
¡
δi;Xi,T
¢
=
TP
t=1
log fi
¡
xi,t; δi|Xi,t−1
¢
LC (δ, θ;X) =
TP
t=1
log
³bξ0t|t−1ηct´
with
ηct =
⎡
⎣ c (u1,t(δ1), ..., un,t(δn); θ| st = 1)
c (u1,t(δ1), ..., un,t(δn); θ| st = 0)
⎤
⎦ ; ui,t(δi) = Fi
¡
xi,t; δi|Xi,t−1
¢
and bξ0t|t−1 filtered from ηct as
bξt/t = hbξ0t|t−1ηcti−1 ³bξt|t−1 ¯ ηct´bξt+1/t =M 0.bξt|t
Proof : see Appendix A.
Several options are available for the estimation of the initial value bξ1|0. One approach is to set
it equal to the vector of unconditional probabilities, which is the stationary transitional probability
of the Markov chain. Another simple option is to set bξ1|0 = N−11N . Alternatively it could be
considered as another parameter, which will be estimated subject to the constraint that 10Nbξ1|0 = 1.
We will use the first option here.
Through the above decomposition, we notice that each marginal log likelihood function is
separable from the others. Therefore, even if the estimation of all margins is performed in a first
step, we can estimate each set of marginal parameters separately into this step. The first step
is then equivalent to n single estimations of univariate distributions. The two-step estimation is
formally written as follows:
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bδ = argmax
δ=(δ1,...,δ4)∈∆
4X
i=1
Li (δi;Xi,.) (3.19)
bθ = argmax
θ∈Θ
LC
³bδ, θ;X´ (3.20)
The estimator for the parameters of the marginal distributions is then bδ = ³bδ1, ...,bδ4´, withbδi = ³bμi, bλi, bωi, bβi, bαi, bγi´0 ; and bθ = ³bρN ;bρA; bP ; bQ´ includes all the estimators of the parameters
involved in the dependence structure. ∆ and Θ represent the sets of all possible values of δ and θ
respectively.
3.6 Testing asymmetry in dependence
We want to test the hypothesis H0 : (P = 1 and Q = 0) where P and Q are the parameters of the
transition probability matrix. The natural way to evaluate whether dependence is asymmetric is
to test the null hypothesis of one normal copula regime against the alternative hypothesis of two-
copula regimes including the normal one and the asymmetric one. This test faces many irregularity
problems. Under the null hypothesis, some nuisance parameters are unidentified and the scores are
identically zero. These are the general problems of testing in RS models. Hansen (1996) describes
the asymptotic distributions of standard test statistics in the context of regression models with
additive nonlinearity. Garcia (1998) and Hansen (1992) provide the asymptotic null distribution
of the likelihood ratio test. Andrews and Ploberger (1993) address the first problem in a general
context and derive an optimal test. The above procedures solve the problem of unidentified nuisance
parameters under the null and the identically zero scores. However, there is an additional problem
of testing parameter on the boundary. Andrews (2001) deals with this boundary problem but in
the absence of the first two problems.
Maximized Monte Carlo (MMC) tests of Dufour (2005), which are a generalization of classical
Monte Carlo (MC) tests of Dwass (1957) and Barnard (1963), are adapted for tests facing all
these problems. The MC tests of Dwass (1957) and Barnard (1963) are performed by doing many
replications (with the same size as the sample data) under the null hypothesis, and compute the test
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statistic for each replication. The distribution of the test statistic is therefore approximated by the
distribution of the obtained values. One can therefore compute the value of the test statistic with
the data and deduce from the MC distribution the p-value of the test. The classical MC test does
not deal with the presence of nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis. The MMC of Dufour
(2005) addresses the problem of nuisance parameters under the null. When the tests statistic
involve the nuisance parameters as in the case of the likelihood ratio test under the alternative,
the values of these parameters are needed to compute the test statistic on simulated data. The
MMC technique is the maximization of the p-values given all the possible values of the nuisance
parameters. This test is computationally very demanding. However, Dufour (2005) proposes a
simplified version which focus on the estimated values of the nuisance parameters and shows that it
works under the assumptions of uniform continuity, and convergence over the nuisance parameter
space. Our model satisfies these assumptions of uniform continuity and convergence. Therefore,
we can apply this simpler version also known as parametric bootstrap test.
4. Dependence structure in international bond and equity mar-
kets: an empirical investigation
4.1 Data
We will consider the same model for two pairs of two countries. First, we model the equity and
bond markets in the United States and Canada. The US equity returns are based on the SP 500
index, while the Canadian equity returns are computed with the Datastream index. The bond
series are indices of five-year government bonds computed by Datastream. These bond indices are
available daily and are chain linked allowing the addition and removal of bonds without aﬀecting
the value of the index.
We also consider France and Germany as a pair of countries. An additional interest here will be
to see how the introduction of the European common currency changed the dependence structure
between the asset markets in these two countries. The bond indices are the Datastream five-year
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government bond indices, while the equity indices are the MSCI series.
All returns are total returns and are expressed in US dollars on a weekly basis from January
01, 1985 to December 21, 2004, which corresponds to a sample of 1044 observations. Descriptive
statistics for these bond and equity series are reported in Table 1.
Sharpe ratios appear to be of the same magnitude for both equities and bonds, around 0.6 in
average for the first and slightly above 1 for the second. The United States exhibits the highest
ratios among the four countries. All return series present negative skewness except for the French
bond index. Both mean returns and return volatility are higher in France and Germany than in
the US and Canada. The volatility of returns in France and Germany is more than 23%, while it
is only 18% in the US and Canada.
Unconditional for all eight series are reported in Table 2. The US and Canadian markets
exhibit relatively high correlations, 0.72 for equities and 0.5 for bonds. The same is true for the
France-Germany pair, although the bond markets are tightly linked, with a correlation of 0.94. The
North-American equity markets are less correlated with European equity markets (around 0.2) than
their bond counterparts (around 0.32). The cross-correlations between equity and bond markets
vary from one country to the other. In average the two markets seem to move independently in
the United States, while they are more closely related in Canada (0.44) and in Europe (around
0.3 for both France and Germany). Cross-correlations between equities and bonds in two diﬀerent
countries are negligible, justifying our model specification.
4.2 Marginal distributions
The estimates of the marginal parameters are reported in Table 3. The large values for the βi
parameters (arround 90%) capture the high persistence in volatility. The values of the parameters
α are close to zero and not significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. However, the high
degree of significance for the parameter λ indicates that asset returns are skewed.
One assumption for these GARCH models is that the error terms are i.i.d. Therefore, to verify
if the assumption is fulfilled, we perform some tests of independence on the residuals. The test
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results in Table 4 suggest that the independence assumption of residuals cannot be rejected for all
series with a good degree of confidence.
4.3 Dependence structure in bond and equity markets
Three main conclusions emerge from the empirical results. First, there appears to be a large extreme
cross-country dependence in both markets, while there is little dependence between equities and
bonds in the same country. Second, the dependence structure exhibits a strong nonlinearity. Third,
there seems to be a link between exchange rate volatility and asymmetry of dependence.
4.3.1 US-Canada Dependence Structure
In Table 5, we report the results of estimating the dependence model described in section (3.4). The
cross-country extreme dependence is large in both equity and bond markets, but the dependence
across the two markets is relatively low in both countries. In the asymmetric regime, the TDCs are
larger than 54 % in both bond-bond and equity-equity markets, while both equity-bond TDCs in US
and Canada are lower than 2%. This observation has an important implication for international
diversification. The fact that extreme dependence in international equity and bond markets is
larger than national bond-equity dependence can have a negative eﬀect on the gain of international
diversification and encourage the switching from equity to the domestic bond or risk-free asset in
case of bear markets.
The average absolute value of correlation in the normal regime is larger than 39% for cross-
country dependence and lower than 41% for equity-bond dependence. In the last case the correlation
between bonds and equities in Canada is unusually high. The results underline the diﬀerences
between unconditional correlation and the correlation in the normal regime. In fact, the presence of
extreme dependence in the negative returns explains this diﬀerence since the multivariate Gaussian
distribution has independence in the tails of returns regardless of the level of correlation.
The separation of the distribution into two parts, including the normal regime and the asymmet-
ric regime, allows to capture the strong nonlinear pattern in the dependence structure. Moreover,
it is interesting to see that for a high unconditional correlated couple such as the US and Canada
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equity markets, this separation gives not only an extreme dependence for the asymmetric regime,
but also a high correlation in the normal regime (87 %) that appears larger than the unconditional
correlation (72 %). This result may seem counter-intuitive if we take the unconditional correlation
as a “mean” of the correlations in the two regimes. Of course, one must realize that the asymmet-
ric regime can be characterized by a low correlation but by a large TDC. This demonstrates the
importance of distinguishing between correlation and extreme dependence. The mixture model is
better able to capture this distinction in fitting the data. A normal distribution may be a good
approximation for measuring finite distance dependence, but an appropriate copula structure is
necessary for characterizing extreme dependence.
4.3.2 France-Germany Dependence Structure
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. Due to a high cross-country unconditional correlation
in both markets, the results for France and Germany are more eloquent. The dependence between
equities and bonds is low, while the dependence between assets of the same type is large in both
regimes. For France and Germany, equity-equity correlation and bond-bond correlation are larger
than 90% while bond-equity correlations are lower than 21% in the same country as well as between
the two countries. In the asymmetric regime, the TDC are larger than 67% between assets of the
same type and lower than 2% between bond and equities in both France and Germany.
To analyze the eﬀect of the Euro on the dependence structure, we split the observation period in
two sub-periods, before and after the introduction of the currency. Tables 7 and 8 contain the results
for the respective subperiods. We find that the introduction of the Euro increases the correlation in
the normal regime between the French and German markets. Before the introduction of the Euro,
in the normal regime, the cross-country correlation between assets of the same type is in average
80%, against more than 96% after the introduction. The cross-asset correlations exhibit a similar
pattern since all correlations increase after the introduction of the Euro. This result is consistent
with those of Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2003) who find that the introduction of a fixed
exchange rate leads to a structural break characterized by a high correlation.21 For the asymmetric
21The goal of Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2003) was to investigate the asymmetric eﬀect of past news on the
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regime, the results are more surprising since the extreme dependence between the French and
German equity markets drastically decreases from 87% to 26%. All the other extreme dependence
coeﬃcients increase, but only the TDC of the FR bond-DE bond pair increases significantly. Since
this change in the level of dependence suggests a relationship between the dependence structure
and the exchange rate, we investigate in the next section for both pairs of countries.
To conclude, let us mention that the results of the Monte Carlo tests shown in Table 9 confirm
the presence of asymmetry in the dependence structure in both pairs of countries.
4.3.3 Link between asymmetric dependence and the exchange rate
The filtered probabilities to be in asymmetric regime for France and Germany show a clear break
after the introduction of the Euro (see figure 8). Before its introduction, the dependence is more
likely asymmetric and becomes more Gaussian after the event.
To confirm this graphical observation, we perform a logistic regression of the conditional prob-
abilities to be in the asymmetric regime on the volatility of the exchange rate.22
For France and Germany, we have:
bPt = a
-1.26e+0
(6.81e-2)
+ b ×
5.06e+2
(2.29e+1)
V olt + et
The R − square of the regression is 0.86. The explained variable bPt = log (Pt/(1− Pt)), Pt is
the conditional probability to be in the asymmetric regime given the time-t available information,
and V olt is the exchange rate volatility between the two countries obtained by a M-GARCH(1,1)
filter.
We run the same regression for US and Canada to investigate if the relation holds when no
structural change occurs. The results are similar to the European results.
correlation. Since it is well documented that the negative shocks have a larger eﬀect on volatility than the positive
shocks of the same magnitude, they try to see if the result is similar for correlation.
22Since the probability Pt to be in a regime is between 0 and 1, the logistic regression allows us to keep this constraint
by proceeding as follows Pt = exp(a+V olt+εt)/(1+exp(a+V olt+εt)) or equivalently log (Pt/(1− Pt)) = a+bV olt+εt
and we can perform the usual regression.
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bPt = a
-7.71e-1
(1.76e-1)
+ b ×
9.30e+1
(2.36e+1)
V olt + et
The R− square of the regression remains high at 0.75.
These results suggest that high exchange rate volatility is associated with asymmetric depen-
dence. With the introduction of the European currency the dependence between France and Ger-
many becomes more normal. This result is coherent with the literature, which finds asymmetric
dependence mainly in the international markets (see Longin and Solnik, 2001). We find the same
asymmetric dependence in international bond markets as well. This evidence is reflected in the
fact that in the normal regime the correlation is higher than the unconditional correlation. More-
over, since the introduction of the Euro reduces the volatility of the exchange rate, it increases the
correlation due to the link between a fixed exchange rate and the normal distribution regime.
5. Asymmetric Dependence Eﬀect on International Diversifica-
tion
The benefits of international diversification are well documented in the literature (see Solnik, 1974,
DeSantis and Gerard, 1997 and reference therein). However, investors tend to invest mainly in
their country despite these alleged international diversification benefits. In fact, the share invested
by home investors in domestic assets is much larger than the share predicted by the Mean-Variance
(MV) model. Two main explanations have been put forward. Transaction costs for international
assets reduce the expected gain on foreign assets, while information asymmetry between local and
foreign investors increases the risk of foreign assets. These explanations aﬀect the first two moments
of asset returns. The transaction costs aﬀect the first moment by reducing the expected return and
the asymmetric information aﬀects the second moment since it increases the risk of foreign assets.
Glassman and Riddick (2001) perform an empirical assessment of these potential explanations.
Using data for six developed countries, they find that to explain the deviations, transaction costs
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must be in excess of 1% per month, 14—19% per year,23 against the actual estimation of 1—4%
per annum, with some variation across countries (see, e.g., Perold and Sirri, 1994; Solnik, 1996).
Moreover, Glassman and Riddick (2001) find that the implied volatility that matches the portfolio
data is greater than twice the historical volatility and therefore is unreasonable.
We go beyond the two first moments to investigate the eﬀect of skewness and specially co-
skewness on cross-country diversification and also on bond against equity diversification. We show
how strong dependence for lower returns in two markets can reduce co-skewness and therefore
reduce skewness in a portfolio with long positions on both markets. Since the reduction of co-
skewness lowers the gains of diversification, investors tend to hold a higher share of low risk assets
than in a MV portfolio.
Two recent studies have examined the portfolio allocation eﬀects of asymmetric correlation
or dependence between equities and cash. In a two-regime correlation model, Ang and Bekaert
(2004) find that the investor tends to switch to cash when a persistent bear market hits, while
Patton (2004) notices a significant gain when an investor takes into account the existence of the
asymmetric dependence structure. Here we examine the eﬀects of asymmetric dependence on cross-
country diversification and on domestic diversification between bonds and equities.
The agent’s wealth at time t invested in domestic and foreign bonds and equities is described
by the following equation
Wt =Wt−1
h
wtηhtR
h,b
t + wt
¡
1− ηht
¢
Rh,et + (1− wt) η
f
tR
f,b
t + (1− wt)
³
1− ηft
´
Rf,et
i
,
where Rh,bt , R
h,e
t , R
f,b
t , and R
f,e
t are the returns of domestic bond, domestic equity, foreign bond,
and foreign equity respectively. We adopt a specification which simplified the analysis of two men-
tioned eﬀects, cross-country and domestic diversification. So, wt is the share invested in domestic
assets, the remaining (1− wt) being invested in foreign assets, while ηht and η
f
t are the shares
invested in domestic and foreign bonds respectively.
23France, Germany, Japan, UK, Canada, and the US.
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5.1 Investor Problem
To analyze the eﬀects of asymmetric dependence on cross-country and domestic diversification, we
assume that the investor has to choose the share wt invested in domestic assets, and the bond shares
ηht and η
f
t . Therefore, the return on his domestic portfolio is R
h
t = wtηhtR
h,b
t + wt
¡
1− ηht
¢
Rh,et ,
while the return on the foreign portfolio is Rft = (1− wt) η
f
tR
f,b
t + (1− wt)
³
1− ηft
´
Rf,et . His
portfolio wealth for one period is then Wt = Wt−1
h
wtRht + (1− wt)R
f
t
i
. The investor is assumed
to maximize his expected utility function EU (Wt) .
Going back to Samuelson (1970), we can consider that a cubic expansion provides a reasonable
approximation of the expected utility function, especially for distributions with low volatility. In
order to take into account the third moments, we consider a cubic Taylor expansion of expected
utility around the average wealth.
E (U (Wt)) = U
¡
Wt
¢
+
U 00
¡
Wt
¢
2
E
¡
Wt −Wt
¢2
+
U 000
¡
Wt
¢
3!
E
¡
Wt −Wt
¢3
+ o(4),
where Wt = E (Wt), and o(4) represents the terms of order larger than three that are supposed
to be negligible compared to the terms of smaller order. We also made the usual assumptions
regarding the properties of the investor’s utility function, that is positive marginal utility (U 0 ≥ 0),
risk aversion (U 00 ≤ 0), and non-increasing absolute risk aversion (U 000 ≥ 0).
The third centered moment of the investor portfolio is given by
E
¡
Wt −Wt
¢3
= W 3t−1
h
w3t σ3htsht + (1− wt)
3 σ3ftsft
+ 3w2t (1− wt)σ2htσftchft + 3wt (1− wt)
2 σhtσ2ftchft
i
where
σ2it = var
¡
Rit
¢
;
sit = E
Ã
Rit −E
¡
Rit
¢
σit
!3
≡ Skew
¡
Rit
¢
;
cijt = E
⎛
⎝
Ã
Rit −E
¡
Rit
¢
σit
!2⎛
⎝
Rjt −E
³
Rjt
´
σjt
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ ≡ CoSkew
³
Rit, R
j
t
´
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When a representative international investor has positive shares of foreign and domestic assets
in his portfolio, skewness and co-skewness aﬀect positively investor expected utility. Intuitively,
when skewness (or co-skewness) decreases, the investor is less likely to diversify. In presence of
negative skewness, investor will diversify less than he does for the MV portfolio which corresponds
to a case of zero skewness. The results below formalize this intuition.
5.2 Asymmetric Dependence and Cross-Country Portfolio Diversification: Home
Bias Investment
The importance of skewness in asset pricing and portfolio choice is well documented by Harvey
and Siddique (2000) and the references therein. They find a negative trade-oﬀ between expected
returns and skewness. In a portfolio with a long position in two assets, co-skewness has a similar
eﬀect since it is positively related to the portfolio skewness. In a MV trade-oﬀ behavior, for a
portfolio of two identically distributed assets, we allocate one half of the portfolio to each asset.
When the variance of one asset increases, its share decreases. The issue here is to investigate what
is the eﬀect of asymmetric dependence through co-skewness when we consider the third moment
for expected utility.
To characterize asymmetric dependence, Longin and Solnik (2001) use exceedance correlation.
This characterization does not allow us to make a link with the portfolio third moment. With
the copula model we developed in the previous sections, it is possible to establish a link between
co-skewness and asymmetric dependence.
Proposition 5.1: For F and F 0 with the same marginal distributions and the same correlation
coeﬃcient, let (X1,X2) Ã F ≡ (F1, F2, CrG) and (X 01,X 02) Ã F 0 ≡ (F1, F2, CN ) , where CrG is a
rotated Gumbel copula and CN is a Gaussian copula such that CN ≤ CrG. Therefore
⎧
⎨
⎩
CoSkew (X1,X2) ≤ CoSkew(X 01,X 02)
CoSkew (X2,X1) ≤ CoSkew(X 02,X 01)
Proof see Appendix
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This result means that a strong dependence in lower returns creates a lower (or large negative)
co-skewness. To analyze the eﬀect of co-skewness on international diversification, we start from
the MV optimal portfolio and then show that introducing skewness in the objective function,
asymmetric dependence will reduce the portfolio share invested in the higher risk assets for very
risk averse investors.
Proposition 5.2: If the following conditions are satisfied
i)
¯¯¯¯
¯ Pn≥4: 1n!U (n)
³
Wt
∗´ hE ³W ∗t −W ∗t´ni
¯¯¯¯
¯ ¿
¯¯¯¯
3P
n=0:
1
n!U
(n)
³
W ∗t
´ h
E
³
W ∗t −W
∗
t
´ni¯¯¯¯
: validity of
the third order approximation of expected utility around W ∗t , the MV optimal portfolio final wealth
ii) the optimal share invested in domestic assets in a MV behavior w∗t is in the range (1/3, 1),
and is such that
σft
σht
> δ (w∗t ) ≡
w∗t (2− 3w∗t )
(1− w∗t ) (3w∗t − 1)
: large (perceived) risk for foreign portfolio.
iii) CoSkew
³
Rht , R
f
t
´
= CoSkew
³
Rft , R
h
t
´
≡ ct,
then there exists a threshold ct such that for ct ≤ ct we have
∂
∂wt
EU (Wt)
¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
> 0
where U (n) is the n-order diﬀerential of U , and U (0) = U .
Proof see Appendix
This proposition can be interpreted as follows. A strong downside market dependence which
creates co-skewness combined with a large foreign risk implies that the share invested in the do-
mestic portfolio will increase compared with the share invested in MV framework. This provides
an additional explanation for the home bias phenomenon. We may notice that the lower threshold
δ (.) for the ratio between foreign and domestic volatilities is a decreasing function of w∗t , with
δ (0.5) = 1. It means that if in the MV framework less than half of the wealth is invested in the
domestic portfolio, foreign volatility should be greater than domestic volatility to insure that strong
downside dependence will increase the home investment.
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5.3 Asymmetric Dependence Eﬀect on Domestic Diversification: Flight to Safety.
Starting at the MV optimal point, we can also perform local analysis of the asymmetric dependence
eﬀect on the equity and bond diversification. Let ηht
³
w∗t , η
f∗
t
´
, the optimal share of bonds in the
domestic portfolio, be a function of w∗t the MV optimal share invested in domestic assets, and η
f∗
t the
MV optimal share of bonds in the foreign portfolio. As in the case of cross-country diversification,
it can be similarly shown that asymmetric dependence will introduce a bond bias for a very risk
averse investor. So, ηht will increase in the asymmetric regime, if its MV optimal solution ηh∗t
belong to the range (1/3, 1). A similar behavior will be observed for the share of bonds in the
foreign portfolio.
The main intuition for the eﬀect of asymmetric dependence on home bias is the increasing share
invested in the asset with lower risk. The same intuition explains the fact that in the presence of
asymmetric dependence, investors will increase the share of bonds in their portfolio relatively to
equity.
For less risk averse agents, the bond share is lower in the asymmetric framework than the share
in the normal regime, but it becomes larger for investors with higher risk aversion. These results are
related to the downside risk premium found by Ang et al (2006). Actually, diversification beyond
a certain level increases downside risk and due to the trade-oﬀ between this risk and the expected
return, investors should adjust their portfolio according to their risk aversion level.
5.4 Monte Carlo Optimization Procedure for Portfolio Choice under each Regime
The aim of this exercise is to investigate the eﬀect of asymmetric dependence on portfolio choice.
So, we assume that the investor knows the regime of dependence. We perform one period ahead
optimization for each regime, and for marginal distributions, we use the simple Gaussian distribu-
tion.
1. We estimate the parameters in our regime switching model with the Gaussian and asymmetric
dependence structure. We get the correlation coeﬃcients for Gaussian regime and the tail
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dependence coeﬃcients for the asymmetric regime.
2. For each regime of dependence, we generate n =10,000 independent drawsRt,i =
³
Rh,bt,i , R
h,e
t,i , R
f,b
t,i , R
f,e
t,i
´
,
i = 1, ..., n, 100 times using univariate unconditional Gaussian distribution for any single re-
turn.
3. We can therefore compute for each simulation the portfolio component weights³
w∗∗t , ηh∗∗t , η
f∗∗
t
´
= argmax
wt,ηht ,η
f
t

1
n
nP
i=1
U (Wt,i),
whereWt,i =
h
wtηhtR
h,b
t,i + wt
¡
1− ηht
¢
Rh,et,i + (1− wt) η
f
tR
f,b
t,i + (1− wt)
³
1− ηft
´
Rf,et,i
i
, and the util-
ity function is replaced by the third-order approximation to avoid explosive solution due to the
discretization of expected utility.
Simulation Results
As expected, the empirical results show a positive link between the level of risk aversion and the
share invested in lower risk assets (bonds). Given the lower level of Canadian market volatilities
compared to the US in our sample period, a similar positive link is observed between the Canadian
portfolio share and the risk aversion level. One important fact is the point where the share invested
in the Canadian portfolio becomes larger in the asymmetric regime compared to the Gaussian
regime. As expected from the theoretical analysis, this point is between 1/3 and 1.
Since the chosen home country (Canadian) market in our sample is less risky than the foreign
(US) market, the only eﬀect of the 10% adjustment for foreign perceived risk is the shift of the
share invested in the Canadian portfolio. Of course, this share increases in both regimes.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the abilities and the limitations of some classical models to reproduce
asymmetric dependence and the need to disentangle marginal asymmetry from dependence asym-
metry. Using copulas we provide a flexible model to achieve this aim. We build a two regimes
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dependence model, and by applying it to international bond and equity markets, we put forward
some interesting facts about the dependence structure.
The dependence between the equity markets on one hand and the bond markets on the other
were found to be much larger than the dependence between equities and bonds even in the same
country. Extreme dependence appears especially large in cross-country bond markets and equity
markets taken separately. The proposed model allows us to investigate the relationship between
the filtered probabilities to be in the asymmetric regime with other factors. This was not possible
with the Longin and Solnik (2001) model.
Using this model we analyse in a simple portfolio choice framework, the implications on in-
ternational investment and national bond and equity diversification. We find that, to reduce the
downside risk eﬀect due to strong comovement of markets in bad situation, very risk averse investor
when taking into account the asymmetric dependence, will increase the part invested in low risk
country, and inside each country, he will increase the bond part. These results are in line with what
is commonly called flight to safety and at the same time give an additional explanation to the lack
of international diversification known as the home bias puzzle. International investors face high
extreme dependence in bear markets and therefore lose the diversification gain when they most
need it.
We find that the exchange rate volatility may be a factor behind the asymmetric behavior of
international market dependence. Therefore, it will be interesting to use a model similar to the
model explored in this paper, possibly incorporating exchange rate, to study the portfolio of an
international investor with loss aversion in the spirit of Ang et al (2002).
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
To prove this proposition, we need the two following lemmas
Lemma 1: (a) Let
©
f (s)
ªn
s=1 be a family of symmetric multivariate density functions of
n (≤ ∞) variables with same mean. The mixture f =
nP
s=1
πsf (s), where
nP
s=1
πs = 1, and πs ≥ 0
for any s, is a symmetric multivariate density function. (b) Moreover for a continuum of sym-
metric multivariate density function
©
f (σ)
ª
σ∈A⊆R with same mean, the mixture f =
Z
A
πσf (σ)dσ,
where
Z
A
πσdσ = 1, is a symmetric multivariate density function.
Proof : Let μ be the mean of all f (s) (and all f (σ))
f (μ− x) =
nP
s=1
πsf (s) (μ− x)
by symmetry of all f (s), we have,
nP
s=1
πsf (s) (μ− x) =
nP
s=1
πsf (s) (μ+ x) = f (μ+ x)
i.e. f (μ− x) = f (μ+ x) and the part (a) follows. Similarly for mixture of continuum,
f (μ− x) =
Z
A
πσf (σ) (μ− x) dσ =
Z
A
πσf (σ) (μ+ x) dσ = f (μ+ x) and we have (b).
Lemma 2: Let
©
F (s)
ªn
s=1 be a family of bivariate cdf with zero lower (upper) TDC. The mixture
F =
nP
s=1
πsF (s), where
nP
s=1
πs = 1, and πs ≥ 0, for any s, is a bivariate density function with lower
(upper) TDC.
Proof : we do the proof for lower tail since by “rotation” we have the same result for upper tail.
Let τFL be the lower TDC of F , we have
τFL = limα→0
Pr
£
X ≤ F−1x (α)
¯¯
Y ≤ F−1y (α)
¤
= lim
α→0
Pr
£
X ≤ F−1x (α) , Y ≤ F−1y (α)
¤
Pr
£
Y ≤ F−1y (α)
¤
= lim
α→0
F
¡
F−1x (α) , F−1y (α)
¢
Fy
¡
F−1y (α)
¢
and since F =
nP
s=1
πsF (s), we have
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τFL = limα→0
nP
s=1
πsF (s)
¡
F−1x (α) , F−1y (α)
¢
α
= lim
α→0
nP
s=1
πs
F (s)
¡
F−1x (α) , F−1y (α)
¢
α
=
nP
s=1
πs lim
α→0
F (s)
¡
F−1x (α) , F−1y (α)
¢
α
by definition F (s)
¡
F−1x (α) , F−1y (α)
¢
= C(s)
³
F (s)x
¡
F−1x (α)
¢
, F (s)y
¡
F−1y (α)
¢´
where C(s) is the copula and F (s)x , F
(s)
y the marginal cdf corresponding to F (s), we have
α = Fx
¡
F−1x (α)
¢
=
nP
s=1
πsF
(s)
x
¡
F−1x (α)
¢
so
F (s)x
¡
F−1x (α)
¢
≤ α/πs for all s and similarly F (s)y
¡
F−1y (α)
¢
≤ α/πs,
hence
lim
α→0
F (s)(F−1x (α),F−1y (α))
α = limα→0
C(s)
³
F (s)x
¡
F−1x (α)
¢
, F (s)y
¡
F−1y (α)
¢´
α
≤ lim
α→0
C(s) (α/πs, α/πs)
α
, since copula is increasing function
= 1/πs lim
α0→0
C(s) (α0, α0)
α0
by setting α0 = α/πs
= 0, since F (s) and hence C(s) is zero lower TDC
we therefore have τFL = 0
The part (i) and (ii) of the proposition is the straightforward application of above lemma
• For GARCH with constant mean and symmetric conditional distribution
Xt = μ+Σ
1/2
t−1εt
(+ any GARCH dynamic equation of Σt−1 )
where εt is stationary with symmetric distribution such that E (εt) = 0. The unconditional
distribution of Xt is a mixture of distribution of symmetric variable with same mean μ but possibly
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diﬀerent variance covariance matrix. By applying the lemma 1, we conclude that the unconditional
distribution of Xt is symmetric and (i) follows.
• For RS model with zero TDC
Xt = μst +Σ
1/2
st εt
where st takes a discrete value. Without loss of generality assume that Xt is bivariate and that
st = s, μ+Σ1/2εt is zero TDC such as in the normal case, therefore the unconditional distribution
of Xt is a mixture of distribution with zero TDC. By applying the lemma 2, we conclude that the
unconditional distribution of Xt has zero TDC. and (ii) follows
For (iii), with the same notations as lemma 1, keeping marginal distribution unchanged across
mixture components means that. For discrete case
f (s) (x1, ..., xn; δ, ρ) = c(s) (u1, ..., un; θ)×
nY
i=1
fi (xi; δi), with ui = Fi (xi; δi), hence
f (x1, ..., xn; δ, ρ) =
nP
s=1
πsf (s) (x1, ..., xn; δ, ρ)
=
nP
s=1
πsc(s) (u1, ..., un; θ)×
nY
i=1
fi (xi; δi)
= c (u1, ..., un; θ)×
nY
i=1
fi (xi; δi)
with c (u1, ..., un; θ) =
nP
s=1
πsc(s) (u1, ..., un; θ) is the copula of f and we can see that c is a mixture
of copula with symmetric TDC and hence is a copula with symmetric TDC.
for the continuum case
f (x1, ..., xn; δ, ρ) =
Z
A
πσf (σ) (x1, ..., xn; δ, ρ) dσ
=
Z
A
πσc(σ) (u1, ..., un; θ) dσ ×
nY
i=1
fi (xi; δi)
= c (u1, ..., un; θ)×
nY
i=1
fi (xi; δi)
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with c (u1, ..., un; θ) =
Z
A
πσc(σ) (u1, ..., un; θ) dσ which is a copula with symmetric TDC for same
the reasons mentioned above.
Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
By definition of a copula, we have
ηt =
⎡
⎣ f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st = 1)
f (Xt; δ, θ|Xt−1, st = 0)
⎤
⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
c (u1,t (δ1) , ..., u4,t (δ4) ; θ |st = 1)×
4Y
i=1
fi (xi,t; δi)
c (u1,t (δ1) , ..., u4,t (δ4) ; θ |st = 0)×
4Y
i=1
fi (xi,t; δi)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
with ui,t (δi) = Fi (xi,t; δi)
By denoting bξt|t−1 = ³bξ(1)t|t−1,bξ(0)t|t−1´0, the likelihood can be rewritten
L (δ, θ;XT )
=
TP
t=1
log
³bξ0t|t−1ηt´
=
TP
t=1
log
Ã
1P
k=0
bξ(k)t|t−1c (u1,t (δ1) , ..., u4,t (δ4) ; θ |st = k )× 4Y
i=1
fi (xi,t; δi)
!
=
TP
t=1
∙
4P
i=1
log (fi (xi,t; δi))) + log
µ
1P
k=0
bξ(k)t|t−1c (u1,t (δ1) , ..., u4,t (δ4) ; θ |st = k )¶¸
it follows that
L (δ, θ;XT ) =
4P
i=1
Li (δi;XT ) + LC (δ, θ;XT )
where
Li
¡
δi;Xi,T
¢
=
TP
t=1
log fi
¡
xi,t; δi|Xi,t−1
¢
LC (δ, θ;X) =
TP
t=1
log
³bξ0t|t−1ηct´
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with
ηct =
⎡
⎣ c (u1,t(δ1), ..., un,t(δn); θ| st = 1)
c (u1,t(δ1), ..., un,t(δn); θ| st = 0)
⎤
⎦
by noticing that ηt = ηct ×
4Y
i=1
fi (xi,t; δi) we have that
bξt/t = hbξ0t|t−1ηti−1 ³bξt|t−1 ¯ ηt´ = hbξ0t|t−1ηcti−1 ³bξt|t−1 ¯ ηct´
Q.E.D
Proof of proposition 5.1
Let (X1,X2)Ã F ≡ (F1, F2, CrG) and (X 01,X 02)Ã F 0 ≡ (F1, F2, CN ).
for w ∈ [0, 1] let X = wX1 + (1− w)X2, and X 0 = wX 01 + (1−w)X 02
E (U (X)) = U
¡
X
¢
+
U 00
¡
X
¢
2
E
¡
X −X
¢2
+
U 000
¡
X
¢
3
E
¡
X −X
¢3
+ o(4)
and E (X 0) = E (X) = X, we have
E (U (X 0)) = U
¡
X
¢
+
U 00
¡
X
¢
2
E
¡
X 0 −X
¢2
+
U 000
¡
X
¢
3
E
¡
X 0 −X
¢3
+ o(4)
by assumption, we have CN ≤ CrG what by the below lemma, is equivalent to F 0 ≤ F , and then
E (U (X 0)) ≥ E (U (X)) for any increasing function U . So for an utility function U that satisfies
Arrow (1971) third main desirable property U 000 ≥ 0, we have E
¡
X 0 −X
¢3 ≥ E ¡X −X¢3.
Since for any w ∈ [0, 1]
E
¡
X −X
¢3
= w3σ31s1 + (1− w)
3 σ32s2
+3w2 (1− w)σ21σ2c12 + 3w (1− w)
2 σ1σ22c21
and
E
¡
X 0 −X
¢3
= w3σ31s1 + (1− w)
3 σ32s2
+3w2 (1− w)σ21σ2c012 + 3w (1− w)
2 σ1σ22c
0
21
we have
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⎧
⎨
⎩
c12 ≤ c012
c21 ≤ c021
i.e.
⎧
⎨
⎩
CoSkew (X1,X2) ≤ CoSkew(X 01,X 02)
CoSkew (X2,X1) ≤ CoSkew(X 02,X 01)
Q.E.D
Lemma: Let F ≡ (F1, F2, C) and (X 01,X 02)Ã F 0 ≡ (F1, F2, C 0).
C 0 ≤ C is equivalent to F 0 ≤ F .
Proof
F 0 ≤ F
⇔ F 0 (x, y) ≤ F (x, y) forall (x, y) ∈ R2
⇔ C (F1 (x) , F2 (y)) ≤ C 0 (F1 (x) , F2 (y)) forall (x, y) ∈ R2
⇔ C (u, v) ≤ C 0 (u, v) forall (u, v) ∈ [0, 1]2
⇔ C 0 ≤ C.
Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 5.2:
The exact expansion of the expected utility function isEU (Wt) =
∞P
n=0
U (n)
¡
Wt
¢
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢(n)
.
Under assumption i), and the third order validity of the Taylor expansion, the sign of
∂
∂w
EU (Wt)
¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
depends on the sign of
∂
∂wt
U 000
¡
W t
¢
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢3 ¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
since saying that w∗t is the optimal part
invested on home portfolio in a Mean-Variance behavior means that
∂
∂wt
(
U
¡
Wt
¢
+
U 00
¡
W t
¢
2
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢2)¯¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
= 0.
and
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∂
∂wt
U 000
¡
W t
¢
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢3 ¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
=
∙
∂
∂wt
U 000
¡
W t
¢¸¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
E
³
W ∗t −W
∗
t
´3
+U 000
³
W ∗t
´ ∂
∂wt
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢3 ¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
we have
∂
∂wt
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢3 ¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
= 3w∗2t σ3htsht − 3 (1− w∗t )
2 σ3ftsft
+3
¡
2w∗t − 3w∗2t
¢
σ2htσftc12t + 3
¡
1− 4w∗t + 3w∗2t
¢
σhtσ2ftc21t
= 3w∗2t σ3htsht − 3 (1− w∗t )
2 σ3ftsft
+
h
3
¡
2w∗t − 3w∗2t
¢
σ2htσft + 3
¡
1− 4w∗t + 3w∗2t
¢
σhtσ2ft
i
ct
= B +Act
with
⎧
⎨
⎩
B = 3
h
w∗2t σ3htsht − (1− w∗t )
2 σ3ftsft
i
A = 3
h¡
2w∗t − 3w∗2t
¢
σ2htσft +
¡
1− 4w∗t + 3w∗2t
¢
σhtσ2ft
i
by assumptions ii) A < 0 and by taking
ct =
"∙
∂
∂wt
U 000
¡
W t
¢¸¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
E(W∗t −W
∗
t )
3
U 000(W
∗
t )
−B
#,
A,
for ct ≤ ct, we have
∂
∂wt
U 000
¡
W t
¢
E
¡
Wt −W t
¢3 ¯¯¯¯
wt=w∗t
> 0, and the proposition 2 follows.
Q.E.D
45
Appendix B. Analytical expressions for various copulas
Normal copula
CN (u1, . . . , un; ρ) = Φρ
¡
Φ−1 (u1) , . . . ,Φ−1 (un)
¢
CN (u1, . . . , un; ρ) =
Z Φ−1(u1)
−∞
. . .
Z Φ−1(un)
−∞
[(2π)n det (ρ)]−
1
2 exp
£
−12
¡
z0ρ−1z
¢¤
dz1 . . . dzn
where z = (z1, . . . , zn)0, ρ =
¡
ρij
¢n
i,j=1, with
¯¯
ρij
¯¯
≤ 1, ρii = 1 and ρ positive defined matrix
cN (u1, . . . , un; ρ) =
¡
det (ρ) exp
£
x0ρ−1x− x0x
¤¢−1/2
with x =
¡
Φ−1 (u1) , . . . ,Φ−1 (un)
¢0,
Φ is cdf of standard normal distribution and Φρ is cdf of multivariate normal distribution with
correlation matrix ρ.
Tail dependence coeﬃcients are
τL = τU = 0
Bivariate Gumbel copula
CG (u, v; θ) = exp
∙
−
³
(− log (u))θ + (− log (v))θ
´1/θ¸
cG (u, v; θ) =
CG (u, v; θ) (log (u) . log (v))
θ−1
uv
³
(− log (u))θ + (− log (v))θ
´2−1/θ µ³(− log (u))θ + (− log (v))θ´1/θ + θ − 1¶
Bivariate Rotated Gumbel (Survival) copula
CGS (u, v; θ) = u+ v − 1 + CG (1− u, 1− v; θ)
cGS (u, v; θ) = cG (1− u, 1− v; θ)
The tail dependence coeﬃcients of CGS are
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τL = 2− 2
1
θ and τU = 0
so θ = θ
¡
τL
¢
=
log (2)
log (2− τL)
and we can re-parameterize the Copula CGS (u, v; θ) with τL as CGS
¡
u, v; τL
¢
= CGS
¡
u, v; θ
¡
τL
¢¢
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Table 1: Summary statistics of weekly bond and equity index returns for the four countries. All
returns are expressed in US dollars on a weekly base from January 01, 1985 to December 21, 2004,
what corresponds to a sample of 1044 observations. (δ Denotes annualized percent). Sharpe ratio
represents the ratio of the mean over the standard deviation of return.
Meanδ Stdδ Kurtosis Skewness Minδ Maxδ Sharpe ratio
US Equity 13.67 17.51 17.00 -1.55 -680.36 311.10 0.78
US Bond 7.57 4.69 0.67 -0.06 -66.91 58.81 1.61
CA Equity 11.24 16.72 13.62 -1.67 -610.87 225.15 0.67
CA Bond 8.81 8.15 1.13 -0.24 -130.55 118.07 1.08
FR Equity 14.72 23.43 7.18 -0.09 -582.12 512.16 0.63
FR Bond 11.52 11.16 0.92 0.04 -142.02 166.68 1.03
DE Equity 12.57 24.97 8.01 -0.46 -574.96 463.08 0.50
DE Bond 10.44 11.56 0.82 -0.01 -142.54 171.39 0.90
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Table 2: Unconditional correlations between diﬀerent assets (bond and equity) of four
considered countries.
US US CA CA FR FR DE
Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity
US Bond 0.0576
CA Equity 0.7182 0.0116
CA Bond 0.1783 0.4706 0.4392
FR Equity 0.1957 -0.0182 0.1974 0.1065
FR Bond -0.0499 0.3386 -0.0080 0.2433 0.3066
DE Equity 0.2089 -0.0536 0.1995 0.1009 0.8099 0.2625
DE Bond -0.0832 0.3081 -0.0234 0.2143 0.3084 0.9403 0.2847
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Table 3: Estimates of M-GARCH (1, 1) parameters for all bond and equity returns of four countries. The
figures between brackets represent standard deviations of the parameters. L is the value of the log likelihood
function.
US CA FR DE
Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond
β 7.94e-1 7.82e-1 8.09e-1 9.07e-1 9.68e-1 9.36e-1 9.24e-1 9.56e-1
(3.49e-1) (1.62e-1) (4.06e-1) (1.79e-1) (3.61e-1) (4.21e-1) (1.54e-1) (2.45e-1)
α 5.46e-5 2.63e-6 6.40e-5 7.30e-6 2.28e-5 1.51e-5 2.22e-5 1.08e-5
(4.04e-5) (6.36e-5) (8.16e-5) (2.94e-5) (9.35e-6) (2.17e-5) (2.14e-4) (1.88e-5)
γ 4.45e+1 3.84e+1 2.73e+1 3.28e+1 1.91e+1 6.53e+0 1.19e+1 3.26e+0
(1.70e-2) (6.11e-3) (1.14e-2) (1.22e-2) (1.61e-2) (1.85e-1) (8.07e-2) (2.45e-2)
λ 1.72e+0 1.37e+1 3.13e+0 1.01e+1 1.61e+0 5.61e+0 1.78e+0 6.13e+0
(1.39e-2) (1.05e-2) (2.09e-2) (7.59e-3) (7.22e-3) (1.96e-1) (6.33e-2) (7.86e-3)
ω 7.57e-6 6.49e-6 1.21e-5 3.49e-6 1.99e-6 1.51e-7 6.46e-5 4.79e-7
(9.64e-5) (1.90e-5) (1.74e-5) (2.52e-5) (6.53e-5) (4.33e-5) (1.92e-4) (3.25e-5)
μ 1.07e-3 7.18e-4 1.32e-3 4.73e-4 1.48e-3 5.37e-4 6.51e-4 1.35e-4
(1.29e-4) (6.74e-5) (3.76e-5) (5.26e-5) (5.00e-4) (1.45e-4) (1.32e-4) (3.38e-5)
L 2.49e+3 3.77e+3 2.50e+3 3.20e+3 2.10e+3 2.88e+3 2.04e+3 2.84e+3
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Table 4: Box-Pierce and Ljung-Box statistics for tests of independence of residuals. For each series, the
statistic is computed for diﬀerent numbers of lags (1, 4, 6, and 12). * and ** means that we cannot reject
independence at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively
US CA FR DE
Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond Equity Bond
Box-Pierce
12 lags 23.26* 18.57** 14.42** 9.27** 10.93** 9.88** 8.64** 12.19**
6 lags 14.85* 12.19** 10.26** 7.17** 10.70** 5.06** 4.55** 8.85**
4 lags 8.73** 10.49* 9.02** 6.34** 7.00** 3.7099** 3.39** 6.36**
1 lag 5.36* 0.01** 3.71** 0.45** 6.11* 1.33** 3.18** 2.78**
Ljung-Box
12 lags 23.43* 18.71** 14.51** 9.32** 10.98** 9.97** 8.71** 12.28**
6 lags 14.93* 12.25** 10.31** 7.20** 10.74** 5.09** 4.57** 8.90**
4 lags 8.76** 10.55* 9.05** 6.37** 7.02** 3.7248** 3.40** 6.38**
1 lag 5.37* 0.01** 3.72** 0.45** 6.13* 1.33** 3.19** 2.79**
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Table 5: Dependence structure between the United States and Canada in equity and bond markets.
Correlation coeﬃcients are reported for the normal regime, while tail dependence coeﬃcients describe
the asymmetric regime. The tail dependence coeﬃcient is obtained as the product of parameter τ and the
respective weight π for cross-asset dependence and 1-π for cross-country dependence. Standard deviations
are reported between parentheses for all parameters estimated directly from the model. The last raw
reports the diagonal elements of the transition probability matrix.
Cross-Country (US-CA) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
τ TDC((1-π)τ)
US Equity - CA Equity 0.8739 0.9100 0.7917
(0.1560) (0.0185)
US Bond - CA Bond 0.3870 0.6234 0.5424
(0.0831) (0.0124)
1-π 0.6897
Cross-Asset (Equity-Bond) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
US Bond CA Bond τ TDC(πτ)
US Equity -0.1101 0.1234 US Equity - US Bond 0.1300 0.0169
(0.0416) (0.0312) (0.041)
CA Equity -0.0812 0.4085 CA Equity - CA Bond 0.1385 0.0180
(0.0207) (0.0103) (0.0145)
π 0.3102
(0.0207)
Parameters of transitional probability matrix
P 0.9020 Q 0.9586
(0.0207) (0.0206)
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Table 6: Dependence structure between France and Germany in equity and bond markets. Correlation
coeﬃcients are reported for the normal regime, while tail dependence coeﬃcients describe the asymmetric
regime. The tail dependence coeﬃcient is obtained as the product of parameter τ and the respective
weight π for cross-asset dependence and 1-π for cross-country dependence. Standard deviations are
reported between parentheses for all parameters estimated directly from the model. The last raw reports
the diagonal elements of the transition probability matrix.
Cross-Country (FR-DE) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
τ TDC((1-π)τ)
FR Equity - DE Equity 0.9083 0.9554 0.7787
(0.0267) (0.0603)
FR Bond - DE Bond 0.9901 0.8261 0.6733
(0.058) (0.027)
1-π 0.8151
Cross-Asset (Equity-Bond) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
FR Bond DE Bond τ TDC(πτ)
FR Equity 0.1893 0.2023 FR Equity - FR Bond 0.0923 0.0171
(0.0170) (0.0129) (0.028)
DE Equity 0.1175 0.1294 DE Equity - DE Bond 0.0969 0.0179
(0.0214) (0.030) (0.029)
π 0.1849
(0.0294)
Parameters of transitional probability matrix
P 0.8381 Q 0.9373
(0.0270) (0.0373)
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Table 7: Subperiod I (period before the introduction of the Euro currency: from January 01, 1985
to December 29, 1998 for a sample of 731 observations). Dependence structure between France and
Germany in equity and bond markets. Correlation coeﬃcients are reported for the normal regime, while
tail dependence coeﬃcients describe the asymmetric regime. The tail dependence coeﬃcient is obtained
as the product of parameter τ and the respective weight π for cross-asset dependence and 1-π for cross-
country dependence. Standard deviations are reported between parentheses for all parameters estimated
directly from the model. The last raw reports the diagonal elements of the transition probability matrix.
Cross-Country (FR-DE) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
τ TDC((1-π)τ)
FR Equity - DE Equity 0.6924 0.9554 0.8663
(0.0760) (0.035)
FR Bond - DE Bond 0.9082 0.8388 0.7606
(0.038) (0.061)
1-π 0.9067
Cross-Asset (Equity-Bond) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
FR Bond DE Bond τ TDC(πτ)
FR Equity 0.2091 0.1641 FR Equity - FR Bond 0.1130 0.0105
(0.0123) (0.0151) (0.021)
DE Equity 0.1205 0.1519 DE Equity - DE Bond 0.0067 0.0006
(0.0106) (0.049) (0.072)
π 0.0933
(0.010)
Parameters of transitional probability matrix
P 0.0651 Q 0.9438
(0.0103) (0.0102)
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Table 8: Subperiod II (period after the introduction of the Euro currency: from January 05, 1999
to December 21, 2004 for a sample of 313 observations). Dependence structure between France and
Germany in equity and bond markets. Correlation coeﬃcients are reported for the normal regime, while
tail dependence coeﬃcients describe the asymmetric regime. The tail dependence coeﬃcient is obtained
as the product of parameter τ and the respective weight π for cross-asset dependence and 1-π for cross-
country dependence. Standard deviations are reported between parentheses for all parameters estimated
directly from the model. The last raw reports the diagonal elements of the transition probability matrix.
Cross-Country (FR-DE) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
τ TDC((1-π)τ)
FR Equity - DE Equity 0.9426 0.2598 0.2582
(0.0950) (0.0106)
FR Bond - DE Bond 0.9937 0.8946 0.8892
(0.0382) (0.071)
1-π 0.9940
Cross-Asset (Equity-Bond) Dependence
Normal Regime Asymmetric Regime
Correlation Coeﬃcient Tail Dependence Coeﬃcient
FR Bond DE Bond τ TDC(πτ)
FR Equity 0.2272 0.2350 FR Equity - FR Bond 0.2249 0.0013
(0.0241) (0.0177) (0.024)
DE Equity 0.1516 0.1573 DE Equity - DE Bond 0.9760 0.0059
(0.0118) (0.059) (0.082)
π 0.0060
(0.012)
Parameters of transitional probability matrix
P 0.9212 Q 0.2274
(0.0118) (0.0117)
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Table 9: Monte Carlo Tests of Asymmetric Dependence. LR is the likelihood ratio statistic
computed from the data. The p − value is obtained from 1000 Monte Carlo repetitions with size
1043 (equal to the sample size) each.
US-Canada France-Germany
LR 0.0731 0.7889
p− value 0.0090 0.0000
Table 10: Longin and Solnik (2001) likelihood ratio test for extreme dependence correlation
equal to zero at diﬀerent thresholds. We apply this test on data, the regime switching model of
Ang and Chen (2002), and the rotated Gumbel copula. we estimate the RS model and rotated
Gumbel copula model and use estimates to simulate 10 000 Monte Carlo replications. We then
perform the test on these replications.
RS Model Data Rotated Gumbel copula
Threshold LR p-value LR p-value LR p-value
0.10 0.7800 0.3771 1.5501 0.2131 0.4091 0.5224
0.20 2.2650 0.1323 1.5550 0.2124 8.6980 0.0032
0.30 16.7210 0.0000 8.0980 0.0044 14.4370 0.0001
0.40 22.3550 0.0000 30.9550 0.0000 27.6261 0.0000
0.60 15.5351 0.0001 285.1200 0.0000 258.9300 0.0000
0.70 10.8120 0.0010 168.6500 0.0000 219.2812 0.0000
0.80 7.2661 0.0070 69.1500 0.0000 71.2000 0.0000
0.90 3.4170 0.0645 20.3500 0.0000 29.7101 0.0000
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Table 11: Results of Monte Carlo estimation of diﬀerent weights for a canadian investor portfolio
with bond and equity from Canada and US. The panel A represents the share of home assets in the
whole portfolio, the panel B and C the bond share in the Canada and US portfolio respectively,
while the panel D represents Canada portfolio share with 10 percent adjustment for foreign (US)
perceived risk. for 100 simulations we present the median as the estimate and also the minimum
and maximum.
Gaussian Asymmetric
Gamma Median Minimum Maximum Median Minimum Maximum
Panel A: Canada portfolio share
1 -2.8677 -5.0000 -0.3824 -3.5974 -5.0000 -0.7353
3 -0.2875 -1.1575 0.5314 -0.3384 -1.2916 0.5876
7 0.4468 0.0775 0.7916 0.5917 0.1788 0.9740
10 0.6051 0.3533 0.8496 0.8022 0.5119 1.0672
20 0.7905 0.6700 0.9158 1.0677 0.9146 1.1974
Panel B: bond share in the Canada portfolio
1 -0.6066 -1.7036 0.5019 -0.7865 -2.3595 0.9861
3 0.4313 0.0705 0.8057 0.4234 -0.0934 1.0083
7 0.7276 0.5742 0.8924 0.7693 0.5486 1.0172
10 0.7931 0.6849 0.9117 0.8488 0.6935 1.0206
20 0.8684 0.8135 0.9341 0.9464 0.8656 1.0294
Panel C: bond share in the US portfolio
1 -1.2634 -2.2837 -0.1876 -1.6277 -3.0289 -0.1749
3 0.1867 -0.1487 0.5422 0.1091 -0.3511 0.5857
7 0.5999 0.4562 0.7505 0.6024 0.4038 0.8030
10 0.6922 0.5919 0.7974 0.7136 0.5731 0.8519
20 0.7996 0.7495 0.8542 0.8416 0.7702 0.9095
Panel D: Canada portfolio share with 10 percent adjustment for perceived risk
1 -1.8560 -4.1211 0.5242 -2.3029 -4.8884 -0.0394
3 0.1487 -0.5973 0.9319 0.1638 -0.6703 0.8984
7 0.7193 0.4023 1.0474 0.8688 0.5121 1.1736
10 0.8449 0.6256 1.0728 1.0312 0.7800 1.2406
20 0.9928 0.8821 1.1003 1.2334 1.1034 1.3353
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Figure 1: Calculates correlations from US-Canada equity returns data for diﬀerent values of thresh-
old θ, which is normalized. For θ less than 50% the correlation is calculated for left tail and for θ
greater than 50%, the correlation is calculated for right tail. θ = 80% means that we calculate the
correlation conditional on 20% greatest observations for both U.S. and Canadian equity returns,
and θ = 10% means that we calculate the correlation conditional on 10% lowest observations for
both U.S. and Canadian equity returns. Solid line represents the exceedance correlations calcu-
lated directly from data. For Rotated Gumbel Copula (with Gaussian Margins), Normal Regime
Switching Distribution, and Normal Distribution, we first estimate the model and use estimates
to generate 50 000 Monte Carlo simulations to calculate correlations. Longin_Solnik exceedances
correlations are obtained by Longin and Solnik (2001) estimation method.
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of marginal distribution asymmetry on Tail Dependence function and Exceedance
correlation: Firstly we simulate standard bivariate Gaussian distribution with correlation 0.5 and
compute TDF and Exceedance correlation. Secondly, we create asymmetry in one marginal distri-
bution by replacing the N(0, 1) by a mixture of N(0, 1) and N(4, 4) with equal weight.
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Figure 3: Model structure: Disentangling marginal distributions from the dependence structure
with a two-regime copula, with one symmetric regime and one asymmetric regime. The marginal
distributions are regime-free.
          Equity Bond  Equity            Bond    Equity  Bond 
 
Country A 
 
 
 
 
Country B 
 
•  • 
 
 
 
•  • 
Countries  
independence 
 •   • 
 
 
 
•   • 
 
Bond vs Equity 
independence 
 •   • 
 
 
 
 •  • 
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of the three components of asymmetric copula. Each component is the
product of the two bivariate copulas representing the corresponding encircled couple of returns.
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Figure 5: Annualized bond and equity returns time series for US and Canada, with their conditional
volatilities obtained using the M-GARCH (1,1).
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Figure 6: Annualized bond and equity returns time series for France and Germany, with their
conditional volatilities obtained using the M-GARCH (1,1).
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Figure 7: Conditional probability denotes the probability to be in asymmetric regime conditional
to available information. Exchange rate volatility is the conditional volatility filtered with the
M-GARCH (1,1) model.
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Figure 8: Canadian (home) portfolio share inside the international portfolio including both bonds
and equities from Canada and US. The dash line represents optimal weight under normal depen-
dence regime, while solid line represents optimal weight under asymmetric dependence structure.
The second graph assume 10% more perceived risk for foreign (US) market. The standard devia-
tions for US bond and equity are multiplied be 1.1.
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Figure 9: The bond share inside home (Canadian) portfolio and foreign (US) portfolio. The dash
line represents optimal weight under normal dependence regime, while solid line represents optimal
weight under asymmetric dependence structure.
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Chapter 2
Asymmetric Dependence Implications for Extreme
Risk Management
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1. Introduction
The value-at-risk (VaR) which defines the maximum loss on an investment over a specified
time horizon at a given confidence level is become the key measure for financial risk used by many
banks and financial institutions. Despite its widespread adoption by the financial community, the
VaR concept faces some criticisms1. To respond to these criticisms a complementary measure was
proposed. Called expected shortfall (ES) it is the average loss when the VaR is violated. Both risk
measures are very useful to manage extreme risk. However, the issue of their accurate estimation
remains a challenge. In fact the estimates of VaR and ES depend on the distribution model. For
the univariate models, Aas and Hobæk Haﬀ (2006) find that GH skewed Student-t distributions
have a better data fit for the univariate skewed financial returns.2 In the multivariate parametric
framework, the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) of Engle (2002) is commonly used to model
the dynamics of dependence. In this setup, the Gaussian or Student-t distribution assumption is
usually made. Although these models are easy to implement and can give satisfactory results in
many situations, they can be seriously misleading in the case where data exhibit strong asymmetric
dependence.
Actually, one of the most important empirical facts observed in multivariate financial returns, is
a much stronger correlation between equity returnsin bear markets than in normal or boom phases.
This phenomenon known as asymmetric correlation or more generally asymmetric dependence has
been analyzed by Longin and Solnik (2001), Ang and Bekaert (2002), Ang and Chen (2002), Garcia
and Tsafack (2007), and references therein.
This paper examines the implications of ignoring this fact when implementing a model to
estimate extreme risks such as VaR and ES. We show that by using multivariate Gaussian laws
to characterize conditional distributions when a strong asymmetric dependence is present, one will
1Artzner et al. (1999) set four criteria that any coherent measure must satisfy and show that the VaR violates
one of them. Basak and Shapiro (2001) also find that investors who just care about the VaR will take positions such
that when the VaR is violated the loss can be very extreme
2The α-stable distributions, which are similar to skewed-t distributions, but with a more flexibility in the tails
control should also be good candidates to modeling univariate skewed data (see Garcia Renault and Veredas, 2004).
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underestimate VaR and ES. The strong dependence for low returns increases the downside risk
and this additional risk cannot be captured by the Gaussian distribution. By introducing a lower
tail dependence, the Student-t distribution corrects this shortcoming of the Gaussian distribution.
However, the symmetric property of the Student-t means also the same dependence in the upper
tail and this will reduce the downside risk. The risk model that takes into account asymmetric
dependence should allow lower tail dependence and upper tail independence as put forward by
Longin and Solnik (2001).
Following Lee and Long (2002), we introduce asymmetric dependence into the DCC framework.
The idea is that for Gaussian distributions, the zero correlation means independence, what is not
the case for asymmetric dependence. To keep the DCC setup, we perform a transformation of
the innovation vector to obtain uncorrelated variables and use a Student-t copula to capture tail
dependence or more importantly, a Gumbel copula to capture the asymmetry.
The empirical investigations using US and Canada equity and bond indices, shows that at the
5% level all three dependence specifications (Gaussian, Student-t, and Gumbel) provide a good
estimation of VaR. However at this same level, Gaussian and Student-t seriously underestimate the
ES. For a more prudential level (1% and 0.5%), symmetric specifications tend to underestimate VaR
more than they do for ES. The asymmetric dependence specification namely the Gumbel copula
works well at all levels.
In the next section of this paper, we deal with the estimation of extreme risk in the multivari-
ate framework, and provide theoretical arguments to explain why symmetric dependence tend to
underestimate VaR and ES. Section 3 presents backtesting and underestimation test procedures,
while the empirical analysis is carried out in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Portfolio Risk and Dependence Structure Modeling
When measuring the risk of a portfolio, a nice approach should be to express it as an analytical
function of individual risk levels for diﬀerent components of this portfolio and their dependence
parameters. It is the case for a risk measure as the variance of a portfolio which is completely
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defined by the variances of diﬀerent components and the correlation between them. For extreme
risk measures like VaR and expected shortfall, it is not always possible to write the risk level of a
portfolio as a function of the risk levels of its diﬀerent components. Although these extreme risk
measures are simple to define, their accurate estimation can be very challenging. In fact, the VaR
of a portfolio depends on two main components. The distributions of diﬀerent single assets and
the dependence structure between all individual assets. Since the VaR is a quantile, it takes into
account the distribution shape contrary to the variance which is completely defined by just the
second moment.
Formally, the value at risk V aRp(X) of a variableX for a specified time horizon and a given level
p is defined by: Pr[X ≤ −V aRp(X)] = p, and the related Expected Shortfall (ES) which is the aver-
age loss beyond the VaR is ESp (X) = −E [X|X ≤ −V aRp(X)] = −p−1E [X.I (X ≤ −V aRp(X))].
When dealing with multivariate modeling, Gaussian or conditional Gaussian multivariate dis-
tributions are usually used. In this situation, the correlation coeﬃcients completely characterize
the dependence among the variables and the estimation of both VaR and ES is straightforward.
2.1 Gaussian Case
The most common and easy approach to modeling multivariate asset returns is to assume nor-
mality. In this case, the value at risk is completely defined by the first two moments. If Xt
is a normal variable, the analytical expression of the value at risk is given by: V aRp (Xt) =
−
³
E (Xt) + Φ−1 (p) [var (Xt)]1/2
´
, where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution.
For a two-asset portfolio Xt = wtX1t + (1−wt)X1t, if (X1t,X2t) is a joint Gaussian distribution,
then
V aRp (Xt) = −
¡
μXt +Φ
−1 (p)σXt
¢
with
⎧
⎨
⎩
μXt = [wtμ1t + (1− wt)μ2t]
σXt =
h
w2t σ21t + (1− wt)
2 σ22t + 2wt (1− wt) ρtσ1tσ2t
i1/2 ,
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where μit is the mean and σit the standard deviation of Xit and ρt the correlation coeﬃcient
between X1t and X2t. So in the case of normal distributions, the VaR of portfolio is expressed
in closed form as a function of the parameters of diﬀerent single asset returns and the correlation
coeﬃcient between them. Moreover, both VaR and ES are related by the expression
ESp (Xt) + μXt =
φ
£
Φ−1 (p)
¤
pΦ−1 (p)
¡
V aRp (Xt) + μXt
¢
.
So, the expected shortfall is
ESp (Xt) = −μXt + σXt
φ
£
Φ−1 (p)
¤
p
where φ denotes the density of a standard normal distribution.
2.2 Multivariate GARCH
Volatility clustering is an important stylized fact that should be taken into account when dealing
with conditional distributions of asset returns. For univariate distributions, GARCH models are
commonly used to forecast the conditional volatility. The straightforward generalization of the
univariate GARCH model brings some problems in the estimation process. Engle (2002) introduces
a new class of multivariate GARCH models which is the generalization of the Bollerslev (1990)
model. In fact, to allow tractability in multivariate GARCH, Bollerslev (1990) assumes a constant
conditional correlation (CCC). The dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) of Engle (2002) extends
this model by allowing time variation for correlation coeﬃcients. As Engle (2002), we use a two-
step estimation procedure for all models. In the first step, we estimate parameters of marginal
distributions, and use them in a second step to estimate the parameters of the dependence structure.
2.2.1 Univariate Distribution Model
Lee and Long (2006) find that for multivariate models, the choice of copula functions is more
important than the choice of the volatility models. Similarly, we will focus on the eﬀect of the
dependence structure on downside risk estimation. Therefore it is necessary to use for all diﬀerent
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multivariate models the same marginal specification. For all single asset xit, we use the simple
GARCH(1,1) model.
⎧
⎨
⎩
xit = μit + σitεit, i = 1, 2
σ2it+1 = ωi + βiσ
2
it + αi (xit − μit)
2
2.2.2 Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC)
Recently proposed by Engle (2002) to capture the time dynamics in the correlation, the DCC model
is become a benchmark model for multivariate specifications. One of the attractive points of this
model is its flexibility in term of the specification of marginal distributions separately from the
dependence structure. In our context of bivariate models, the GARCH(1,1)-type specification of
conditional correlation coeﬃcient ρt = corr (x1t, x2t) is the following.
ρt =
q12,t√q11,tq22,t
with the auxiliary variable qij,t defined by the dynamic
qij,t+1 = ρij + a
¡
εitεjt − ρij
¢
+ b
¡
qij,t − ρij
¢
.
The conditional value at risk V aRpt (Xt) is defined by Pr[Xt ≤ −V aR
p
t (Xt)| Ft−1] = p, where
Ft−1 is the information set available. For a Gaussian or a conditional Gaussian distribution, the
importance of dependence is completely driven by the correlation coeﬃcient. However, for a more
complex dependence structure, even if all components are individually conditional Gaussian (but
not jointly), the portfolio VaR becomes more complex and depends on the shape of the dependence
structure. The portfolio return distribution can be very complex. In fact, the distribution of a
linear combination involves convolution for which it is diﬃcult to get an analytical expression. In
a such context, the most common technique used is the Monte Carlo simulations and the accuracy
of estimation will depend on how the dependence model fits the data.
By writing ⎡
⎣ x1t
x2t
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣ μ1t
μ2t
⎤
⎦+
⎡
⎣ 1 0
ρt
p
1− ρ2t
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣ η1t
η2t
⎤
⎦ ,
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we have corr (η1t, η2t) = 0. Then, if (x1t, x2t) is a bivariate normal vector, the zero correlation
means that η1t and η2t are independent. However, if the joint normality is not valid as it is the
case in many practical situations, the zero correlation does not necessary mean independence. This
is the case of asymmetric dependence.
2.3 Asymmetric Dependence Distributions and Extreme Risk Measures
Lower returns are more dependent than upper returns in financial markets, especially in interna-
tional asset markets. Longin and Solnik (2001) investigate the structure of correlation between
various equity markets in extreme situations and find that equity markets exhibit a much higher
correlation in extreme bear periods and zero correlation for asymptotic upper returns. Garcia
and Tsafack (2007) by using tail dependence functions extend this analysis in terms of nonlinear
dependence and find similar results.
2.3.1 Beyond Symmetric Dependence: Copula
Any bivariate distribution is defined by its marginal univariate distributions and its dependence
structure between both variables. To completely characterize the dependence structure, we use
copulas which are functions that build multivariate distribution functions from their unidimensional
marginal distributions. Let X ≡ (X1,X2) be a vector of two variables. Denoting F the joint
distribution function and F1 and F2 the respective marginal distributions of X1 and X2. The Sklar
theorem3 states that there exists a function C called copula which joins F to F1 and F2 as follows.
F (x1, x2) = C (F1 (x1) , F2 (x2)) (2.1)
Equivalently the copula function C is directly defined as follows.
C (u1, u2) = F
¡
F−11 (u1) , F
−1
2 (u2)
¢
; u1, u2 ∈ [0, 1] (2.2)
3See Nelsen (1999) for a general presentation. Note that if Fi is continuous for any i = 1, ..., n then the copula C
is unique.
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The nice thing about copulas is that we can model some stylized facts like asymmetric depen-
dence without changing the DCC specification. By continuing to keep the zero correlation between
η1t and η2t, we can use the Gumbel copula to model their dependence structure.
2.3.2 Underestimation of VaR and ES
Practitioners usually use the Gaussian (or symmetric) distributions in the computation of the
extreme risks of their portfolios. In fact, if data exhibit asymmetric dependence, the use of the
Gaussian distribution will be misleading. The issue of interest is to know on which side will the
dependence be stronger. In other words, if the extreme risk will be overestimated or underestimated.
In this section we will develop some theoretical arguments that give us intuition about why the
Gaussian dependence structure underestimates these risks.
By using copulas, any bivariate cumulative distributional function can be represented with
three elements as F ≡ (F1, F2, C) such that F (X1,X2) = C (F1 (X1) , F2 (X2)), with Fi be the
cumulative distribution function of Xi, and C the copula function of (X1,X2). We want to analyze
the eﬀect of the third element which characterizes the dependence structure on the extreme risk
measures. It is therefore relevant to keep the first and second elements which characterize the
marginal distributions unchanged.
Definition 1. (Stochastic ordering,: ≺st Joe, 1997 ). F 0 ≺st F if
R
gdF 0 ≤
R
gdF for all
increasing functions g for which the expectations exist
The concept of stochastic ordering is equivalent to stochastic dominance in the case of univariate
distribution.4 The result below can be seen as an extension of the mean preserving spread to the
multivariate case.5
Proposition 1. Let (X1,X2)Ã F ≡ (F1, F2, C) and (X 01,X 02)Ã F 0 ≡ (F1, F2, C 0) .
4For univariate distributions F and F 0, by taking g (v) = −I (v ≤ x) which is an increasing function, we have
U
gdF 0 ≤
U
gdF implies F 0 (x) ≥ F (x). So F 0 ≺st F is equivalent to F 0 ≥ F .
5Here we are focusing on bivariate distributions for the sake of presentation. The proof of this result in the
appendix is valid for any dimension.
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Denote X = wX1 + (1− w)X2 and X 0 = wX 01 + (1− w)X 02 w ∈ [0, 1]
If C 0 ≺st C then
i) V aRp (X 0) ≥ V aRp (X)
ii) ESp (X 0) ≥ ESp (X)
Proof see Appendix
This result allows us to understand why the extreme risk measure in a left dependence asym-
metric distribution should be larger than the one measured in a symmetric distribution with low
dependence in the lower tail. The result below compares a normal copula with a rotated Gumbel
copula.
Definition 2. (Tail dependence). For a copula C, the lower tail dependence coeﬃcient is
τL ≡ lim
u→0
C (u, u)
u
while the upper tail dependence coeﬃcient is
τU (α) ≡ lim
u→1
1− 2u+C (u, u)
u
The tail dependence coeﬃcient measures the level of dependence between extreme events for
both variables. For a Gaussian copula, regardless the level of correlation, both the upper and the
lower tail dependences are zero. However, for a rotated Gumbel copula, the upper tail dependence
is zero, while the lower tail dependence is strictly positive except in the case of independence. From
this observation, we can compare both copulas in term of stochastic ordering.
Proposition 2. Let CN be a normal copula and CrG be a rotated Gumbel copula. If they are
stochastically ordered,
then CrG ≺st CN
Proof see Appendix
It is not always possible to compare a Gaussian copula and a rotated Gumbel copula, however
when it is the case, the rotated Gumbel copula is lower ordered than the Gaussian one. This result
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can not be straightforwardly extended to the comparison of a Student-t copula with a rotated
Gumbel copula, since the tail dependence coeﬃcient of a Student-t copula is not necessary zero.
But the fact that a Student-t copula is symmetric suggests that a rotated Gumbel copula should
put more probability in the left tail than a Student-t does. In fact, the level of tail dependence
for a Student-t copula depends on the correlation coeﬃcient and the degree of freedom. For a zero
correlation, the Student-t copula can have a tail dependence and this tail dependence decreases
when the degree of freedom increases and tends to zero for an infinite degree of freedom, since it
corresponds to the convergence of the Student-t distribution to the Gaussian distribution.
3. Testing and Comparison
It is important to perform a number of specification search to find the dependence functions which
provide the best fit for a data set. Using a likelihood, Aikaike and Schwarz’s Bayesian information
criteria we compare the dependence model goodness-of-fit. The accuracy of distribution models to
estimate risk is assessed furthermore by backtesting using unconditional and conditional coverage.
Finally we test the assumption of underestimation of VaR and ES in three dependence structure
specifications (Gaussian, Student-t and Gumbel).
3.1 Backtesting
We present below the backtesting procedure for unconditional and conditional coverage. The first
one tests the accuracy of violation probability assuming independence between successive violations,
while conditional coverage also tests the independence.6
3.1.1 Unconditional Coverage
Let It = I (Xt ≤ −V aRp (Xt)) be the indicator of violation or not. The value 1 for It indicates
that a violation occurred, while the value 0 means no violation. For a well specified risk model, the
6A complete presentation can be found in Christoﬀersen (2003).
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time series {It}t=1,...T should be time independent and follow identical Bernoulli distribution with
the probability p for 1. So we test the null hypothesis
H0 : It Ã i.i.d.Bernoulli(p)
against
H1uc : It Ã i.i.d.Bernoulli(π) , π 6= p
The likelihood function is analytically derived and the likelihood ratio test can be easily per-
formed. Denote
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T1 =
TP
t=1
It
T0 =
TP
t=1
(1− It) = T − T1
,
the (log) likelihood ratio statistic is given by
LRuc = −2 ln
h
(1− p)T0 pT1
.³
(1− T1/T )T0 (T1/T )T1
´i
Ã χ21
3.1.2 Conditional Coverage
The independence assumption can also be tested along with probability of violation accuracy.
Therefore the alternative hypothesis should include the time dependence between It and It+h. We
test
H0 : It Ã i.i.d. Bernoulli(p)
against
H1cc : It ÃMarkov(Π1) , with Π1 =
⎡
⎣ π00 π01
π10 π11
⎤
⎦
By denoting Tij the number of observations of It with an i value followed by a j value. Formally,
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T11 =
T−1P
t=1
ItIt+1
T10 =
T−1P
t=1
It (1− It+1)
T01 =
T−1P
t=1
(1− It) It+1
T00 =
T−1P
t=1
(1− It) (1− It+1)
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The likelihood ratio for this hypothesis is given by
LRcc =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−2 ln
³
(1− p)T0 pT1
.
(1− bπ01)T00 bπT0101 (1− bπ11)T10 bπT1111 ´ , if bπ11 6= 0
−2 ln
³
(1− p)T0 pT1
.
(1− bπ01)T00 bπT0101 ´ , if bπ11 = 0
where bπij = Tij /(Ti0 + Ti1) is the estimated probability of a j follows an i. The asymptotic
distribution of LRcc is a χ22.
3.2 Testing the Extreme Risk Underestimation
For a risk manager, assessing the accuracy of the risk model is important and knowing if the model
underestimates or not the risk is very important, since the underestimation can be very costly.
We propose below simple ways to assess the underestimation of both value at risk and expected
shortfall.
3.2.1 A Simple Test of VaR Underestimation
When the model is well specified the proportion of violations is exactly p. Formally by denoting
π = E [It], the expected proportion of violations with VaR computed under the true data generating
process, we should have π = p. However, if the value at risk is underestimated, the expected number
of violations will be larger than p, i.e. π > p. Then the testing hypothesis is
H0 : π = p
against
H1 : π > p
The estimator of π is bπT = 1T TP
t=1
It. Under the null, we have It Ã i.i.d. Bernoulli(p). Therefore,
it is a simple and well-known unilateral test for the mean of a variable.
3.2.2 A Simple Test of ES Underestimation
If we are using the correct risk model the expected shortfall should be exactly the mean of the returns
in the portfolio tail with probability p. Therefore the regression of (−Xt −ESt) I (Xt ≤ −V aRp (Xt))
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on a constant term, will give zero coeﬃcient. So, if we perform the regression
−Xt −ESt = c+ εt, where Xt ≤ −V aRp (Xt) .
A correct model will produce zero for the estimate of c, while a model which underestimates
the expected shortfall will produce c > 0. We then want to test the hypothesis
H0 : c = 0
against
H1 : c > 0
Once again, this is a simple unilateral test based on a Student-t statistic. The estimate of the
parameter c is proportional to the diﬀerence between the sample mean and the model mean both
computed for losses beyond the VaR.
4. Empirical Investigation
4.1 Data
We use equity and bond index data for US and Canada. The US equity returns are based on the SP
500 index, while the Canadian equity returns are computed with the Datastream index. The bond
series are indices of five-year government bonds computed by Datastream. These bond indices are
available daily and are chain linked allowing the addition and removal of bonds without aﬀecting
the value of the index. All returns are expressed in US dollar on a weekly basis from January 01,
1985 to December 21, 2004, which corresponds to a sample of 1044 observations
To perform VaR forecasting, we split the full sample in two part7. The in-sample period starts
from January 01, 1985 to December 23, 2003 and the out-of-sample period from December 23, 2003
to December 21, 2004. Descriptive statistics are provided in tables 1&3.
7The models are estimated in-sample and the out-of-sample data allow us to assess the forecasting ability of
models. We perform backtests in all sample due to the limited size of out of sample data, however this is enough to
take into account the out-of-sample eﬀects.
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4.2 Dependence Structure
Using the AIC and BIC8 criteria, we perform a comparison between two symmetric copulas
(Gaussian and Student-t) and two asymmetric ones (Clayton and Gumbel9). Table 4 shows that
the Student-t copula is a better fit for our data than the Gaussian one, while the Gumbel copula
is the best of all our compared dependence functions. From the sample correlation coeﬃcients and
the left tail dependence coeﬃcients (TDC) computed from the Gumbel copula, one can notice that
the dependence between equity indices is characterized by a higher level of correlation and also a
stronger level of TDC than the dependence between bond indices.
4.3 Testing Results
To backtest our risk model, we perform both unconditional and conditional coverage tests for VaR
estimation. Underestimation tests are done for both VaR and ES. All these tests are performed on
an equally weighted US-Canada equity and bond portfolios
4.3.1 Equity Portfolio
Given the large correlation and strong asymmetric dependence between equity indices, their port-
folio results are more relevant in term of the asymmetric eﬀect on risk estimation (see table 5). The
results show that at a 5% level all three copula specification models provide good VaR estimates.
For this level of violation probability, there is no need to go beyond Gaussian DCC to estimate
VaR even if it is important to notice that a good risk model for VaR at a specific level does not
insure good estimation for ES at the same level. In fact, the ES depends on the entire shape of the
distribution beyond the VaR at a given level. In other words, to see if a risk model will give a good
estimation for ES or not based on VaR, one should extend the estimation to more lower levels of
violation probability. However, at a 1% violation level, the two symmetric models (Gaussian, and
8AIC and BIC refer to Aikaike and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria respectively.
9Gumbel copula here refers to rotated (or survival) Gumbel copula. Since Gumbel copula has a left tail inde-
pendence and right tail dependence, the rotated Gumbel copula exhibits a right tail independence and a left tail
dependence that is the fact widely observed from data.
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Student-t) fail the two tests at a 10% critical level, while the Gaussian model fails the tests at a
5% critical level. For lower violation level (0.5%) which represents in practice a very prudential
risk management, the Gaussian does worse, while the Student-t improves very well. The Gumbel
copula model passes both tests at all probability levels.
4.3.2 Bond Portfolio
The dependence between bond indices is relatively low and therefore the DCC model seems to work
regardless of the copula specification. Even if as shown in table 6, the Gaussian copula risk model
produces more violations at all probability levels, it passes all tests except only the unconditional
coverage at a 10% critical level. The Student-t and Gumbel specifications perform statistically well.
4.3.3 Underestimation of VaR and ES
In the first panel of the tables 5 and 6, the nimber of violation T1 is especially large for Gaussian de-
pendence. Given this large frequency of violations observed with the sample estimation of coverage
probability compared to the required level (5%, 1%, and 0.5%), we test the risk underestimation
tendency of three models. Both VaR and ES measures are tested.
As shown in the p-value row of panel 3 table 5, the Gaussian model seriously underestimates the
VaR for low levels (1% and 0.5%) for the equity portfolio, while the Student-t which underestimates
the VaR at the 1% level gives a good estimation at 0.5%. Intuitively, this can be explained by the
fact that the strong tail dependence of the Student-t corrects the eﬀect of asymmetry for the lower
tail distribution and reduces the magnitude of underestimation. Surprising although explicable, is
the fact that the ES is more likely underestimated for a large level (5%) (see the p-value row of
panel 4, table 5 and 6). In fact all models provide good estimate of VaR at 5% level, however when
the shape in the tail are not fat enough, the ES will be underestimated.
The figure 1 clearly shows the ranking of the VaR level for the three dependence model spec-
ifications.10 The Gaussian model presents lower estimates of the VaR, while the Gumbel copula
10We don’t present the out-of-sample graphs for other violation levels (5% and .5%) because they have the same
shape and same conclusion in terms of ranking than the 1% level. The ES ranking is the same like the VaR ranking.
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presents upper estimates. This is essentially due to the residual downside risk that the Gaussian
copula cannot capture, while the Student-t partially incorporates it and the Gumbel copula takes
it into account in a more eﬀective way.
5. Conclusion
We provide arguments to explain the fact that symmetric dependence specifications tend to un-
derestimate extreme risk in the presence of asymmetric dependence. In the DCC framework, we
find that the Gaussian and Student-t specifications perform relatively well when the correlation
or the tail dependence is low. However, in the presence of strong asymmetry like it is the case
for equity indices, these symmetric specifications tend to underestimate VaR and ES. Therefore
for the accuracy of risk measures, it is important in presence of asymmetric dependence to use an
asymmetric model such as the Gumbel copula which allows lower tail dependence and upper tail
independence.
We use bivariate models in this work, what is enough to show the eﬀects of the dependence
structure on the risk measures accuracy. However in a practical context to estimate portfolio risk,
one should need a large dimension of multivariate models to capture asymmetric dependence. It
would be necessary to point out that the building of large dimension asymmetric copulas with
more flexibility in the dependence structure among diﬀerent couples remains a challenge in the
statistical literature. The sensitivity to modeling asymmetry in the marginal distributions combine
with asymmetric dependence would be another interesting issue.
85
6. Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove this result, we need the below lemma.
Lemma: Let F ≡ (F1, F2, C) and (X 01,X 02)Ã F 0 ≡ (F1, F2, C 0).
C 0 ≺st C is equivalent to F 0 ≺st F .
Proof of lemma
Let us assume that C 0 ≺st C and let g be an increasing function such that
R
gdF 0 and
R
gdF
exist. we want to show that
F 0 ≺st F , i.e.
R
g (x1, x2) dF 0 (x1, x2) ≤
R
g (x1, x2) dF (x1, x2)
by defining h (u, v) = g
¡
F−11 (u) , F
−1
2 (v)
¢
, since Fi are increasing functions, h is also an in-
creasing function. Therefore C 0 ≺st C impliesR
h (u1, u2) dC 0 (u1, u2) ≤
R
h (u1, u2) dC (u1, u2)
i.e.
R
g
¡
F−11 (u1) , F
−1
2 (u2)
¢
dC 0 (u1, u2) ≤
R
g
¡
F−11 (u1) , F
−1
2 (u2)
¢
dC (u1, u2)
and therefore F 0 ≺st F .
conversely by assuming F 0 ≺st F and define g (x, y) = h (F1 (x) , F2 (y)) we have the above
lemma.
Q.E.D.
with the above lemma, we have by assumption that F 0 ≺st F , for w ∈ [0, 1] by taking
i) g (x1, x2) = −I (wx1 + (1− w)x2 ≤ −V aRp (X)), with I (P ) = 1 if P is true and 0 if not.
g is an increasing function and we haveR
g (x1, x2) dF (x1, x2) = −p ≥
R
g (x1, x2) dF 0 (x1, x2)
then
−
R
I (wx1 + (1− w)x2 ≤ −V aRp (X 0)) dF 0 (x1, x2)
≥ −
R
I (wx1 + (1− w)x2 ≤ −V aRp (X)) dF 0 (x1, x2)
i.e. −V aRp (X 0) ≤ −V aRp (X) or V aRp (X 0) ≥ V aRp (X)
ii) g (x1, x2) = [wx1 + (1− w)x2] I (wx1 + (1− w)x2 ≤ −V aRp (X))
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g is an increasing function since V aRp (X) ≥ 0, and we have
ESp (X) = −E [X|X ≤ −V aRp(X)]
= −p−1E [X.I (X ≤ −V aRp(X))]
= −p−1
R
g (x1, x2) dF (x1, x2)
≤ −p−1
R
g (x1, x2) dF 0 (x1, x2)
= −p−1
R
[wx1 + (1− w)x2] I (wx1 + (1− w)x2 ≤ −V aRp (X)) dF 0 (x1, x2)
≤ −p−1
R
[wx1 + (1− w)x2] I (wx1 + (1− w)x2 ≤ −V aRp (X 0)) dF 0 (x1, x2)
= ESp (X 0)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let CN be a normal copula and CrG be a rotated Gumbel copula that are "stochastically
ordered", we want to show that CrG ≺st CN . Let us suppose the reverse, .i.e. CN ≺st CrG.
Let g (u1, u2) = −I (u1 ≤ u, u2 ≤ u) which is an increasing function. By assuming that CN ≺st
CrG we haveR
−I (u1 ≤ u, u2 ≤ u) dCN (u1, u2) ≤
R
−I (u1 ≤ u, u2 ≤ u) dCrG (u1, u2)
so thenR
I (u1 ≤ u, u2 ≤ u) dCN (u1, u2) ≥
R
I (u1 ≤ u, u2 ≤ u) dCrG (u1, u2)
i.e.
CN (u, u) ≥ CrG (u, u) .
However, since the tail dependence coeﬃcient for normal copula τLN = limu→0
CN (u, u)
u
= 0 and
for rotated Gumbel copula τLrG = limu→0
CrG (u, u)
u
> 0 then there exists η ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
u ∈ (0, η)
CrG (u, u)− CN (u, u)
u
> 0 what is equivalent to CrG (u, u) > CN (u, u). This contradicts the
assumption CN ≺st CrG, so we necessary have CrG ≺st CN
Q.E.D.
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Table 12: Estimates of GARCH (1, 1) parameters for all bond and equity returns. The figures
between brackets represent standard deviations of the parameter estimates.
μ ω α β
US Equity 3.20e-03 5.02e-06 9.19e-01 8.07e-02
( 7.00e-04) ( 2.39e-06) ( 9.80e-03) ( 1.28e-02)
US Bond 1.50e-03 2.06e-06 8.99e-01 5.26e-02
( 2.00e-04) ( 1.02e-06) ( 3.60e-02) ( 1.66e-02)
CA Equity 3.24e-03 1.53e-04 4.21e-01 3.55e-01
( 6.23e-04) ( 1.71e-05) ( 3.27e-02) ( 2.38e-02)
CA Bond 1.78e-03 1.26e-05 8.32e-01 6.65e-02
( 3.41e-04) ( 5.58e-06) ( 5.42e-02) ( 1.68e-02)
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Table 13: Sample correlation coeﬃcient (Corr) and left tail dependence coeﬃcient (TDC) com-
puted with the Gumbel copula.
US-CA Equities US-CA Bonds
Corr TDC Corr TDC
Full Sample 0.7182 0.5058 0.4706 0.3564
In Sample 0.7221 0.5076 0.4779 0.3647
Out of Sample 0.6531 0.4864 0.3817 0.2297
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Table 14: Aikaike (AIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian (BIC) information criteria for two symmetric
copulas (Gaussian and Student-t and two asymmetric copula (Clayton and Gumbel). Estimation
is performed over the in-sample period.
Symmetric Copula Asymmetric Copula
Gaussian Student-t Clayton Gumbel
US-CA Equities
LogLikelihood 3.22e+02 3.29e+02 2.95e+02 3.31e+02
AIC -320.7354 -326.5728 -293.7713 -329.5698
BIC -318.2604 -321.6229 -291.2964 -327.0949
US-CA Bonds
LogLikelihood 1.29e+02 1.39e+02 1.00e+02 1.43e+02
AIC -128.0589 -137.2090 -99.4721 -142.4054
BIC -125.5840 -132.2591 -96.9971 -139.9304
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Table 15: Test results over the full sample for the US and Canada equity 50/50 portfolio (w = 0.5) : the first
panel presents the unconditional backtest. LRuc is the likelihood ratio for unconditional coverage with a χ21
distribution. In the second panel, LRcc is the likelihood ratio for conditional coverage with a χ22 distribution.
πT in the third panel is the sample estimation of violation probability which is used to test the underestimation.
The last panel presents the test results for the ES. c is the diﬀerence between the sample mean of violations and
the ES produced by the model. Three dependence models are tested. The Gaussian (Gauss.), the Student-t (t),
and the Gumbel (Gumb.). Numbers in bold emphasize the statistical significance at the 5 or 10 percent level.
5 %VaR 1 %VaR 0.5 %VaR
Gauss. t Gumb. Gauss. t Gumb. Gauss. t Gumb.
T1 56 52 50 19 17 14 12 8 7
LRuc 0.2925 0.0005 0.0945 5.7219 3.5118 1.1147 6.4753 1.2839 0.5543
p-value 0.5886 0.9822 0.7585 0.0168 0.0609 0.2911 0.0109 0.2572 0.4566
T00 933 941 945 1005 1009 1015 1019 1026 1028
T11 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 0
LRcc 0.3853 0.1506 0.3277 6.5658 4.6692 2.8854 8.7773 1.3086 0.5328
p-value 0.8248 0.9275 0.8489 0.0375 0.0968 0.2362 0.0124 0.5198 0.7661
πT 5.37% 4.99% 4.79% 1.82% 1.63% 1.34% 1.15% 0.77% 0.67%
πT − p 0.37% -0.01% -0.21% 0.82% 0.63% 0.34% 0.65% 0.27% 0.17%
Std Err 0.0070 0.0067 0.0066 0.0041 0.0039 0.0036 0.0033 0.0027 0.0025
t Stat. 0.5286 -0.0213 -0.3115 1.9833 1.6058 0.9601 1.9691 0.9880 0.6766
p-value 0.2986 0.5085 0.6223 0.0238 0.0543 0.1686 0.0246 0.1617 0.2494
c 4.14e-4 4.14e-4 3.17e-4 2.58e-4 2.40e-4 2.16e-4 2.28e-4 2.26e-4 2.08e-4
Std Err 2.25e-4 2.22e-4 2.17e-4 1.97e-4 1.94e-4 1.90e-4 1.90e-4 1.86e-4 1.82e-4
t Stat. 1.8422 1.8622 1.4576 1.3098 1.2357 1.1343 1.2026 1.2117 1.1392
p-value 0.0329 0.0314 0.0726 0.0952 0.1084 0.1284 0.1147 0.1130 0.1274
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Table 16: Test results over the full sample for the US and Canada bond 50/50 portfolio (w = 0.5) : the first
panel presents the unconditional backtest. LRuc is the likelihood ratio for unconditional coverage with a χ21
distribution. In the second panel, LRcc is the likelihood ratio for conditional coverage with a χ22 distribution.
πT in the third panel is the sample estimation of violation probability which is used to test the underestimation.
The last panel presents the test results for the ES. c is the diﬀerence between the sample mean of violations and
the ES produced by the model. Three dependence models are tested. The Gaussian (Gauss.), the Student-t (t),
and the Gumbel (Gumb.). Numbers in bold emphasize the statistical significance at the 5 or 10 percent level.
5 %VaR 1 %VaR 0.5 %VaR
Gauss. t Gumb. Gauss. t Gumb. Gauss. t Gumb.
T1 55 47 43 13 12 11 10 8 6
LRuc 0.1612 0.5529 1.7928 0.5932 0.2277 0.0309 3.4730 1.2839 0.1132
p-value 0.6881 0.4571 0.1806 0.4412 0.6332 0.8605 0.0624 0.2572 0.7365
T00 937 950 958 1016 1018 1020 1022 1026 1030
T11 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
LRcc 1.6695 0.6319 1.8841 0.8746 0.4524 0.2021 3.5933 1.3086 0.0451
p-value 0.4340 0.7291 0.3898 0.6458 0.7976 0.9039 0.1659 0.5198 0.9777
πT 5.27% 4.51% 4.12% 1.25% 1.15% 1.05% 0.96% 0.77% 0.58%
πT − p 0.27% -0.49% -0.88% 0.25% 0.15% 0.05% 0.46% 0.27% 0.08%
Std Err 0.0069 0.0064 0.0062 0.0034 0.0033 0.0032 0.0030 0.0027 0.0023
t Stat. 0.3947 -0.7684 -1.4244 0.7169 0.4556 0.1727 1.5197 0.9880 0.3212
p-value 0.3466 0.7788 0.9227 0.2368 0.3244 0.4315 0.0644 0.1617 0.3741
c 6.61e-5 7.33e-5 3.37e-5 4.37e-5 3.82e-5 2.29e-5 3.11e-5 2.77e-5 2.15e-5
Std Err 3.65e-5 3.51e-5 3.29e-5 2.35e-5 2.24e-5 2.00e-5 2.05e-5 1.93e-5 1.65e-5
t Stat. 1.8133 2.0848 1.0225 1.8585 1.7061 1.1444 1.5123 1.4348 1.3055
p-value 0.0350 0.0187 0.1534 0.0317 0.0441 0.1264 0.0654 0.0758 0.0960
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Figure 10: Out-of-sample forecasts for the equity portfolio 1% VaR using the three dependence
specification models.
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Chapter 3
Proper Conditioning for Coherent VaR in Portfolio
Management
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1. Introduction
Value at risk (VaR) - the amount of money such that there is typically a 95% or 99% probability
of a portfolio losing less than that amount over a certain horizon, has become a central concept in
risk management1. Financial institutions, regulators as well as nonfinancial corporations use this
method to measure financial risk. Although the VaR risk measure seems to agree with a concept
of maximum loss popular with practitioners, it is not a coherent measure of risk, as stressed by
Artzner et al.(1999), since it is not subadditive.
In practice, VaR is also as a tool for risk to manage and control risk. Recently, several authors
have pointed out that the use of VaR as a risk magement tool may entail perverse eﬀects. Basak and
Shapiro (2001) show that VaR risk managers choose a larger exposure to risky assets than non-risk
managers and as a result incur larger losses in the worst states of the world. In general equilibrium,
risk regulation may have the perverse eﬀect of amplifying price fluctuations, as demonstrated by
Basak and Shapiro (2001) and Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2004)).
In this paper, we focus on a decentralized portfolio management system, widespread among
financial institutions, that relies on VaR as a risk measure and risk control tool. In such a sys-
tem, subadditivity appears as a natural requirement. Typically, the supervisory unit in charge of
portfolio management wants to decentralize the management of certain parts of the portfolio to
specialists of market segments. If the unit wants to impose a global VaR amount on the whole
portfolio, subadditivity will allow to decentralize its VaR constraint into several VaR constraints,
one per specialist. The supervisory unit will then be assured that the VaR of the global risk will not
surpass the sum of the individual VaRs. The problem is that, even if one may be ready to assume
that individual risks are mutually independent, Artzner et al.(1999) have precisley given examples
of the nonsubadditivity of VaR even in the case of aggregation of independent risks. A notable
exception is the case where all risks are jointly normally (or more generally elliptically) distributed
, since the quantiles satisfy subadditivity as long as probabilities of exceedance are smaller than a
half.
1See, for example, Jorion (2001).
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We provide an analysis of the feasibility of decentralized risk management through VaR objec-
tives even when subaddivity is violated. The main idea is that, when tail thickness is responsible
for violation of subadditivity, eliciting proper conditioning information may restore a rationale for
a decentralized risk management system based on VaR. In such a Rent-a-Trader system, as it is
often called, the specialists are hired because they have access to specific information on which they
condition their portfolio decisions. Therefore, the central management unit possesses only a subset
of the conditioning information which belongs to each specialist. Naturally, in such a context, a
distribution appears always more leptokurtic to the central unit than to the specialist. Because
of a lack of information, VaR may appear non-subadditive to the central management unit, but
without bad consequences for the actual risk incurred. We are then able to show that decentralized
portfolio management with a VaR allocation to each specialist will work despite evidence to the
contrary. VaR is therefore decentralizable if specialists obey their VaR requirements.
Of course, central management will still want to assess that specialists meet the VaR require-
ments. We distinguish the case where central management has access to some information from the
case where they have to rely on unconditional information only.We provide an illustration where
traders have access to private information, which is unobservable to both central management and
the other traders, but where they communicate their individual portfolio shares to central man-
agement. We discuss ways for central management to improve backtesting of VaR requirements in
this context.
To provide a theoretical underpinning to the validity of such a Rent-a-Trader system for risk
control, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that violations of VaR subadditivity in case of
aggregation of independent risks are basically due to a perverse eﬀect of fat tails. More precisely, we
show that when tails are suficiently thin to ensure the existence of finite absolute expected returns, a
rather realistic assumption, VaR subadditivity is guaranteed at least for suﬃciently large confidence
levels, or equivalently for suﬃciently small levels of the fixed probability of VaR exceedance. The
example of stable distributions is well suited to assess how small is small. In this setting, it is shown
that with a reasonable level of skewness in asset returns, VaR at common confidence levels will be
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subadditive when absolute expected returns have a finite expectation. A contrario, we show that
arbitrarily thick tails may produce arbitrarily large violations of the subaddivity property.
Second, we provide the key argument in favor of the rent-a-trader approach by linking fat tail-
ness to a lack of conditioning information. Through the consideration of higher order moments, we
extend the argument of Clark (1973) to note that in general, the more information we condition the
returns of a portfolio upon, the thinner are the tails of the resulting distribution. This argument
works in particular for scale mixing variables, like stochastic volatility. Moreover, by appealing to
a scale mixture representation property of stable distributions, we show that our framework nests
the family of stable distributions. In other words, we have a way of recovering VaR subadditivity
through a proper conditionning which is valid in particular for stable distributions. This is a satis-
factory result when remembering the early work by Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965), showing
that stable distributions accommodate well heavy-tailed financial series, with the consequence that
it produces measures of risk based on the tails of the distribution, such as value at risk, which
are more reliable (see in particular Mittnik and Rachev, 1993, and Mittnik, Paolella and Rachev,
2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Rent-a-Trader system
whereby portfolio management is decentralized to specialists. Section 3 appeals to some elements
of probability theory to put forward the logical relationships between fat tails, violation of VaR
subadditivity and conditioning information. In section 4, we show that deconditioning by central
management always increase tail fatness and spuriously make VaR look non-subadditive. In section
5, we provide a simple illustration with private signals to traders and show how the transmission of
information in the form of portfolio shares helps to assess risk more accurately. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs of the various propositions are collected in an Appendix.
2. VaR Decentralization with Diﬀerential Information
In this section we describe a decentralized portfolio management system also known that uses VaR
as a tool for risk management. Senior management is interested in the value at risk V aRp(X)
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associated with the random value X of its portfolio:
P [X ≤ −V aRp(X)] = p. (2.1)
This value X will be conformable to a VaR requirement V aR∗p if and only if: V aRp(X) ≤ V aR∗p ,
that is if:
P [X ≤ −V aR∗p] ≤ p. (2.2)
Suppose that senior management hires n traders to manage parts of its portfolio. ThenX = Σnj=1Xj
is the aggregation of the net results Xj of n traders j = 1, . . . , n. Failure of subadditivity for senior
management in this context means that V aRp(
nP
j=1
Xj) may exceed
nP
j=1
V aRp(Xj). We will show in
the next section that violation of subadditivity is a perverse eﬀect of fat tails in the distribution of
X. We will then see that fat tails can be reduced by relying on some conditioning information.
Trader j has obtained result Xj by building a portfolio θj(Ij), which is a function of his private
information Ij . A decentralized management system is used precisely to exploit this private infor-
mation Ij since it is inaccessible to central management. Let us consider that trader j has received
from senior management a target Sj in terms of VaR, that is:
V aRp(Xj |Ij ) ≤ Sj (2.3)
where:
P [Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |Ij ) |Ij ] = p. (2.4)
Note that Sj is a given number chosen by senior management. Typically, the quantity V aRp(Xj |Ij ),
which depends on private information, cannot be observed at the central level. Therefore, senior
management cannot check directly that the requested target (2.3) has been met or equivalently
that:
P [Xj ≤ −Sj |Ij ] ≤ p. (2.5)
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Therefore it must rely on backtesting, with two objectives. First, as usual, senior management
must check on a time series of portfolios returns that X = Σnj=1Xj fulfills the VaR requirement
(2.2). It is quite natural for central management to imagine that this requirement will be ensured
by the enforcement of targets Sj if and only if these targets are chosen ex-ante in order to fulfill:
Σnj=1Sj ≤ V aR∗p. (2.6)
Second, even though (2.5) cannot be observed, senior management should be interested to seek
valuable information about individual trader j behavior. Of course, historical observation allows
him to test for a weak consequence of (2.5), that is:
P [Xj ≤ −Sj ] ≤ p. (2.7)
But, for the targets to appear credible, a tighter control should be performed. Often senior manage-
ment will request that traders communicate their portfolio shares. We will see how this information
can help exercise a better control, but even if this information on individual portfolio shares is trans-
mitted, senior management will never recover fully in practice the information Ij of the individual
traders.
In section 4, we will show that, under a set of natural assumptions, both goals of backtesting
may be met. In other words, it will be true that the enforcement of targets conformable to (2.6)
will ensure (2.2). Moreover, senior management will have at its disposal some relevant information
for a more powerful test of (2.5) than only through its weak consequence (2.7).
3. Conditioning Information, Tails and VaR Subadditivity
We show in a first subsection that violation of subadditivity in the case of aggregation of indepen-
dent risks is basically a perverse eﬀect of fat tails. In a second subsection, we study the logical
relationships between conditioning information and fat tailness, in particular in the context of scale
mixtures of distributions.
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3.1 Tails and Subaddivity
Let us consider two stochastically independent real variables X and Y with cumulative distribution
functions:
FX(x) = P [X ≤ x]
FY (y) = P [Y ≤ y]
A straightforward adaptation of the proof of Feller convolution theorem (Feller, 1971, p 278)
allows us to claim that, when the variable x tends to (−∞), the distribution function FX+Y (x) =
P [X + Y ≤ x] of the sum (X + Y ) is equivalent to the sum of the distribution functions:
FX+Y (x) ∼ FX(x) + FY (x) (3.8)
Let V aRp(X) and V aRp(Y ), as defined in (2.1), the values at risk respectively associated
with the random values X and Y of some portfolio at a given horizon. A first implication of the
convolution property (3.8) is that VaR subadditivity is not really an issue if one of the two risks
has much thinner tails than the other. Suppose for instance that, when x tends to (−∞), FY (x) is
infinitely small with respect to FX(x). Then, large losses in the aggregate portfolio (X + Y ) will
likely come from X and thus, for suﬃciently small levels p of probability exceedence, V aRp(X) is
the right measure of risk to control in order to control the aggregate V aRp(X +Y ), irrespective of
possible violations of subadditivity. In other words, violations of subadditivity may occur but they
are negligible for suﬃciently small levels p .
A more interesting case occurs when X and Y both have a distribution function with a left-
tail behaviour of the following type. For some given function g increasing and unbounded on the
positive real line, there are two positive real numbers aX and aY such that:
aX = Limx7−→−∞g(−x)FX(x)
aY = Limx7−→−∞g(−x)FY (x)
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Hence, by application of (3.8), we have:
aX + aY = Limx7−→−∞g(−x)[FX+Y (x)]
Then, if we assume for notational simplicity that the cumulative distribution functions FX and
FY are continuous and strictly increasing in the neighborhood of (−∞) to allow a unambiguous
definition of inverse functions, we conclude that for suﬃciently small levels of probability p of VaR
exceedance:
V aRp(X) ∼ g−1(
aX
p
),
V aRp(Y ) ∼ g−1(
aY
p
),
V aRp(X + Y ) ∼ g−1(
aX + aY
p
).
The following proposition is easily deduced from these asymptotic equivalences:
Proposition 3.1
If X and Y are two independent random variables such that for some positive numbers aX and
aY and a given function g strictly increasing and continuous on the positive real line:
aX = Limx7−→−∞g(−x)FX(x) and aY = Limx7−→−∞g(−x)FY (x)
we have:
(i) If for all positive u and v: g(u+ v) > g(u) + g(v),
There exists p0 ∈ ]0, 1] such that, for any p ∈ ]0, p0[:
V aRp [X + Y ] < V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y )
(ii) If for all positive u and v: g(u+ v) < g(u) + g(v),
There exists po ∈ ]0, 1[ such that, for any p ∈ ]0, p0[
V aRp [X + Y ] > V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y )
Proof: See the Appendix.
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It is worth noticing that the subadditivity property, maintained above on all the real line either
for the function g or for the function (−g) is actually binding only for arbitrarily large u and v.
Since the function g has been defined to characterize the tail behaviour of the distribution function,
only its behaviour in the neighborhood of (+∞) really matters.
Distributions with such left-tail behavior are all distributions with Pareto-like left tails given in
Feller (1971), FX(x) ∼x−→−∞ aX [−x]−a[Log(−x)]γ , with α > 0 and γ any real number. Conditions
(i) and (ii) about the concavity or convexity of g translate into conditions on α, i.e. α > 1 for (i)
and α < 1 for (ii). Therefore, up to the limit case α = 1, subadditivity of V aRp for suﬃciently
small levels p of probability exceedence is tantamount to finite expectation for absolute returns. In
this respect, non-subadditive VaR remains quite an extreme situation2. However, in the case of very
heavy- tail distributions (α close to zero), we show in the Appendix that violation of subadditivity
may be arbitrarily extreme.
What is most important for our purpose is to be able to ensure subaddivity for suﬃciently small
levels p of probability of exceedence. We want to ensure that the commonly used small values of
p like 1%, 5% or 10% are within the range of maintained subaddivity. To shed more light on the
relevant order of magnitude, we propose to consider the case of stable distributions as a benchmark
example of variables with Pareto-like tails.
A random variable X is said to follow a stable distribution3 Sα(σ, β, μ) for 2 > α > 0, α 6=
1, σ > 0, | β |< 1 and μ any real number if its characteristic function is given by:
E exp(iθX) = exp
½
−σα |θ|α
∙
1− iβ (sign θ) tan Πα
2
¸
+ iμθ
¾
(3.9)
The parameters σ, β and μ are uniquely defined. μ is a location parameter , σ is a scale parameter
and β characterizes the skewness of the distribution: a positive (resp. negative) β implies a
distribution skewed to the right (resp. to the left) while a zero β gives a symmetric distribution.
2Recently, Ibragimov (2004) obtained a similar result with a diﬀerent approach based on the analysis of majoriza-
tion properties of linear combinations of random variables.
3See Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994) for a thorough treatment of stable distributions.
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In particular:
X Ã Sα [σ, β, μ]⇔
X − μ
σ
Ã Sα [1, β, 0] (3.10)
and:
X Ã Sα [σ, β, 0]⇔ (−X)Ã Sα [σ,−β, 0]
In all cases, the support of the distribution is the whole real line. Note that for the sake of
expositional simplicity, we have excluded the limit cases α = 2 (normal distribution) α = 1, and
|β| = 1 (distribution concentrated on one half of the real line).
This parametric family of distributions has Pareto-like tails. If X Ã Sα [σX , β, μX ], we have:
Limx7−→−∞(−x)αFX(x) = ax,
with:
aX =
(1− α)(1− β)σαX
2Γ(2− α) cos(Πα2 )
.
The advantage is that in this case we can assess the level p0 below which the subadditivity
property is characterized. We can therefore state the following corollary to proposition 3.1.
Corollary 3.2
If X and Y are two independent stable variables with similar tails and the same degree of
skewness:
X Ã Sα [σX , β, μX ] and Y Ã Sα [σY , β, μY ] ,
and we consider a probability p of VaR exceedence such that:
p < P [Sα(1, β, 0) < 0]
Then:
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(i) If α > 1:
V aRp [X + Y ] < V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y )
(ii) If α < 1 :
V aRp [X + Y ] > V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y )
It is important to stress that this corollary can be applied for values of the probability p which
are not excessively small. For instance, if β = 0, it applies for p < 1/2. Irrespective of the value
of β, it applies exactly when V aRp(X) > μX and V aRp(Y ) > μY . Note that when α > 1, the
shift parameter μ is equal to the mean. In other words, it is suﬃcient to have absolute returns
with finite means and to consider possible amounts of losses V aRp(X) and V aRp(Y ) beyond the
opposite of the respective means μX and μY to ensure subaddivity of the VaR4.
3.2 Tails and Conditioning Information
Given the importance of tail thickness for VaR subaddivity, we want to argue in this section that,
in general, the larger the conditioning information set is, the thinner the tails should be. Of course,
this claim rests upon some measurement of tail thickness. Extending the common idea of kurtosis
measurement, we characterize tail thickness through higher-order moments.
Let us consider some random variable Y such that |Y |nhas a finite expectation for some positive
real number n. Let m be another real number such that 0 < m < n. We argue that the larger the
ratio E{|Y |
n}
{E{|Y |m}} nm is, the fatter the tails of the distribution of Y should be. According to Malevergne
and Sornette (2006), the major contribution to the magnitude of the moment E{|Y |n} comes from
the values of Y in the vicinity of the maximum of |y|nfY (y), where fY (y) is the probability density
function (pdf) of Y. The magnitude of this quantity increases fast with the order of the moment
we consider. The faster it increases, the fatter are the tails of the pdf of Y . This ratio is the
4Not that we have assumed that X and Y have the same skewness parameter. This assumption, which was not
needed to apply the convolution property, may appear overly restrictive to the point where only β = 0 has some
practical content. Hopefully, the subadditivity should not be lost for not too diﬀerent skewness parameters.
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standard kurtosis measurement when m = 2 and n = 4, with Y measured in deviations from
the mean. To accomodate the case of variables with possibly infinite variance and even infinite
mean, we generalize the standard argument to moments of any order for variables not expressed in
mean-deviation form. To characterize the eﬀect of conditioning information, we extend the result
previously derived by Clark (1973)5 to the case of kurtosis.
Let Y and Z two random variables, where, for notational simplicity, we assume that Y is a
positive real variable and : E[(Y )n] < +∞, 0 < m < n. The tight relationship between conditioning
and tail thickness , as measured by the comparison between higher and lower order moments,
amounts to say that, more often than not:
E
∙
E[(Y )n | Z]
{E[(Y )m | Z]} nm
¸
<
E[(Y )n]
{E[(Y )m]} nm . (3.11)
In other words, conditioning on the variable Z reduces the distance between higher and lower order
moments. We specialize the result to scale mixtures, with Z as a mixture variable, in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3
If the distribution of the random variable Y is a scale mixture with Z as a mixture variable,
that is if Y = σ(Z)u, with Z and u stochastically independent, and if, in addition: E{|u|n} <
+∞, E{|σ(Z)|n} < +∞, 0 < m < n,
Then:
E
∙
E[|Y |n | Z]
{E[|Y |m | Z]} nm
¸
<
E[|Y |n]
{E[|Y |m]} nm
Proof: See the Appendix.
The inequality of proposition 3.3 is very likely to hold in general6 It does hold for a number
of common models that are actually scale mixture models. A popular example is the stochastic
5See in particular corollary 4.1.
6For instance, in the classical case of a zero-mean variable Y with m = 2 and n = 4, inequality (6.22) indicates that
it would take a perversely high positive correlation betwen conditional kurtosis and conditional variance to reverse
the inequality.
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volatility model without leverage eﬀect, as first introduced by Taylor (1982) as a dynamic extension
of Clark (1973). A less-known example is the case of symmetric stable distributions, which can
always be seen as scale mixtures of stable distributions with less fat tails. Indeed, according to
Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994)7, if X is a random variable with a symmetric α− stable distrib-
ution, X Ã Sα(σ, 0, 0), 0 < α < 2, then X can be seen as a scale mixture of stable distributions:
X|A Ã Sα0 (σA1/α
0
, 0, 0), 0 < α < α
0
, where the probability distribution of the mixing variable A
is defined by its Laplace transform: E(exp(−γA)) = exp(−γα/α
0
). Therefore, a random variable
with a symmetric stable distribution8 can produce a stable distribution with less fat tails (higher
α). This illustrates the general proposition above in terms of higher moments.
In this section we have shown that subadditivity of VaR is intimately related to fat tails and
that fat tails are in turn very closely linked to conditioning information. In the next section, we
want to use these two main principles to spell out conditions under which a decentralized portfolio
management system will work in terms of risk control. These conditions will ensure that the VaR
requirement is respected, that is P [Σnj=1Xj ≤ −V aR∗p] ≤ p.
4. Proper Conditioning for Subadditive VaR
We put forward in this section two crucial assumptions that will ensure VaR subadditivity in the
decentralized management system described in section 2. We will assume that these assumptions
are valid at a given probability level p, which will be seen as a relevant confidence level for VaR
calculations such as 1% or 5%.
The first assumption amounts to consider that, even though subadditivity of VaR is not guar-
anteed at the senior management level, there exists a latent information I, nesting all individual
information sets, such that the conditioning by this information would restore subadditivity of VaR.
7See Proposition 1.3.1 p. 20.
8This symmetry assumption is rather realistic for distributions produced by portfolio traders. Indeed, the central
unit does not need to give a benchmark to the traders in the context of a decentralization portfolio management sys-
tem. Therefore, the distribution of interest is not the deviations of the trader’s portfolio returns from the benchmark,
which ought to be skewed to the right, but simply the raw returns of the trader’s strategy. The right skewness of the
latter returns is less of a necessity.
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Of course this conditioning will be unfeasible in practice, but it suﬃces that traders obey their VaR
target for the risk control system to work. Moreover, it shows that eliciting some information from
traders such as portfolio shares will be useful in terms of ex-post risk control or backtesting.
Assumption 1: There exists I ⊃ ∪nj=1Ij such that V aRp(Σnj=1Xj |I ) ≤ Σnj=1V aRp(Xj |I ).
As seen in section 2, the larger the conditioning information set is, the thinner the tails are. In
this case, VaR subadditivity is more likely to hold. In particular, Assumption 1 will be automatically
fulfilled if the joint distribution of the vector (Xj)1≤j≤n of returns is a multivariate scale mixture,
that is for some n-dimensional variable (uj)1≤j≤n conformable to subadditivity (for instance a
Gaussian vector with p ≤ 12) and independent from conditioning information, Xj = σj(I)uj , for
j = 1, ..., n.
The second assumption stated below will be fulfilled if in addition σj(I) depends on information
I only through trader’s j information Ij . This appears as a rather natural assumption in such a
delegated system where each trader is hired because he holds a specific information.
Assumption 2: For all j = 1, . . . , n:V aRp(Xj |I ) ≤ V aRp(Xj |Ij ).
In other words, latent information other than Ij is irrelevant for forecasting the result Xj of
trader’s j investment. This latter condition, a kind of cross-sectional equivalent to a non-causality
assumption (external information does not causeXj given Ij), is fairly natural if one imagines trader
j as an expert of his market segment. Trader j has at his disposal all the relevant information for
his market segment9.
However, assumption 2 is more general than this special case of cross-sectional non-causality.
It only means that the part of latent information that trader j does not observe does not aﬀect his
perceived potential loss with probability p. In particular, we have:
9Note that given Ij , V aRp(Xj |I ) is a random variable which can be constantly below V aRp(Xj |Ij ) (with a
common level of probability p) only if these two variables actually coincide almost surely. In other words, Assumption
2 is a non-causality property in terms of V aRp . It is fulfilled in particular in case of global non-causality, that is if
for all j, the conditional distributions of Xj given I or Ij coincide.
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Proposition 4.1: Assumption 2 implies that, Ij almost certainly:
Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |Ij )⇔ Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |I )
Under assumption 2, conditioning on the larger latent information set does not change the
occurrence of VaR exceedance for j, Ij almost surely10. The most important result of this section
is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: Under assumptions 1 and 2, Σnj=1Sj ≤ V aR∗p and V aRp(Xj |Ij ) ≤ Sj for
all j implies that:
P [Σnj=1Xj ≤ −V aR∗p] ≤ p.
Proofs for these two propositions are provided in the Appendix.
In other words, the VaR target V aRp(Xj |Ij ) ≤ Sj imposed to each specialist j = 1, . . . , n
ensures that the VaR of the portfolio
nP
j=1
Xj will not exceed
nP
j=1
Sj . It is worth emphasizing that
this result has been obtained while VaR may not be subadditive for senior management, that
is V aRp(
nP
j=1
Xj) may exceed
nP
j=1
V aRp(Xj). This convenient result has basically been obtained
through an additional conditioning that has restored subadditivity without introducing additional
perceived risk thanks to assumptions 1 and 2.
As already mentioned, assumption 2 may also be useful for the purpose of backtesting, or more
precisely for ex-post control of the risk-taking behavior of the specialists. Senior management would
like to check that the announced target Sj has been respected by specialist j, that is:
V aRp(Xj |Ij ) ≤ Sj . (4.12)
10Note that the converse is not true in general even though we have, by the law of iterated expectations: Ij ⊂ I =⇒
P [Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |I )|Ij ] = p = P [Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |Ij )|Ij ]. But the equality of probabilities does not imply the
equality of events.
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Although senior management cannot observe the information set Ij , it has access to some partial
information such as the specialists’ actions. Let us assume, at it is often the case in practice, that
the portfolio composition θj(Ij) ∈ Ij , selected by each trader j is available to central management.
Then, by the law of iterated expectations, (2.3)-(2.4) implies that:
P [Xj ≤ −Sj |θj(Ij) ] ≤ p for all j = 1, . . . , n (4.13)
If, as it is often the case, each specialist’s information completely defines the return distribution
of the fund in which the corresponding trader invests and the private information signals Ij , j =
1, · · · , n,are mutually independent, then (4.13) actually means:
P [Xj ≤ −Sj |θk(Ik), k = 1, . . . , n ] ≤ p for all j = 1, . . . , n (4.14)
This condition can actually be tested by senior management from an econometric model of
conditional probability distributions, including for instance ARCH eﬀects (Engle, 1982). We discuss
this issue in the next section. Note that, without maintaining a joint independence assumption,
the non-causality assumption 2 actually implies even more since it ensures that:
P [Xj ≤ −Sj |I ] ≤ p for all j = 1, . . . , n. (4.15)
Then, the control over trader j behavior appears a priori much more powerful than the solely
unconditional control P [Xj ≤ −Sj ] ≤ p that could have been performed without taking advantage
of the observation of specialists’ actions and possibly resorting to assumption 2.
5. A Simple Illustration of a Rent-a-Trader System
We provide an illustration of the general propositions of the previous sections in a simple setting.
The goal of the illustration is to provide a concrete yet basic example where conditioning on
the private information of traders restore VaR subadditivity (assumption 1) and where only the
information of trader j is relevant in forecasting the result Xj of trader’s j investment (assumption
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2). We also discuss in the framework of this example how eliciting information for traders can be
helpful for backtesting VaR exceedances.
We assume that two traders can each choose a portfolio made up of one risk-free asset and two
risky funds. The returns of the two risky funds depend on two state variables s1 and s2. State
variable s1 is observable to trader 1, but unobservable to trader 2 and to central management.
Similarly, trader 2 is the only one to observe s2. The two state variables are assumed to be i.i.d.
Bernoulli (λ).
We can write the returns as eR1 = s1R11 + (1− s1)R0, and eR2 = s2R12 + (1− s2)R0, where
R11, R
1
2 and R
0 are mutually independent with R11 and R
1
2 following the same probability distribution
N
¡
μ1, σ2
¢
and R0 following N
¡
μ0, σ2
¢
. Moreover, the unconditional mean [λμ1 + (1− λμ0] of the
two distributions is assumed to be equal to the risk-free rate11. These assumptions imply that,
without any information on the state variables, a risk averse agent will only invest in the risk-
free asset. Therefore, central management will have an incentive to hire traders 1 and 2, who have
private information on state variables s1 and s2 respectively. In this context, if each trader forms his
portfolio such that the VaR requirement imposed by central management is satisfied conditionally
to any possible value of his private information, then the VaR requirement of the global portfolio
will be satisfied and the apparent violation of subadditivity will not matter.
We further assume that each trader communicates his portfolio shares to central management.
We show how, based on this information, central management can recover statistically the parame-
ters of the conditional distributions of the traders’ portfolio returns and assess whether traders have
respected the VaR requirement or not. It is important to realize that this is just an example while
in the general setting considered above, it has never been assumed that the knowledge of these
individual portfolio shares was a suﬃcient statistic to recover fully the conditioning information of
traders and, by the same token, to restore subadditivity.
11 It is important to realize that funds 1 and 2 have the same conditional means μ1 in state 1 and μ0 in state 0
and the same conditional variance σ2 in any state. They diﬀer only by the realization of the states, which do not
necessarily coincide. For example, fund 1 could be in state 0 when fund 2 is in state 1.
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5.1 Traders’ Behavior
We start by computing the optimal mean-variance portfolio of traders 1 and 2 given their private
information on s1 and s2 respectively. We assume for simplicity that the VaR of their optimal
portfolio is always below Sj12, the target set by central management.
We can write the portfolio return of trader 1 as eR1 = Rf + θ11 ³ eR1 −Rf´ + θ12 ³ eR2 −Rf´.
The expectation and the variance conditional on the state are:
E
³ eR1 |s1 = i´ = Rf + θ11 (μi −Rf )
V ar
³ eR1 |s1 = i´ = θ211σ2 + θ212σ2 (5.16)
Normalizing initial wealth to one, and denoting the risk aversion coeﬃcient of trader 1 by γ1,
the optimal portfolio is solution of:
Max
θ1
©
(Rf + θ11 (μi −Rf ))−
γ1
2
¡
θ211σ2 + θ
2
12σ2
¢ª
with θ1 = (θ11, θ12). The solution bθ1 = ³bθ11,bθ12´ is given by
bθ11 = (μi −Rf ) /γ1σ2bθ12 = 0 (5.17)
The proportion invested in the risk-free asset is 1 − bθ11. Trader 1 never invests in fund 2 for
which he has no information13. Moreover, traders will always include a non-zero share of their
respective risky fund in their optimal portfolio along with the risk-free asset. In the good state,
12When the VaR constraint of trader 1 (resp. 2) binds, it can be shown that he may have to invest a nonzero part
in asset 2 (resp. 1). Therefore, the distribution given the portfolio shares will be a mixture of normals and not a
normal. Conditioning will still make the tails less fat as discussed in the earlier sections, but we prefer to keep things
simple and recover normality and hence restore subadditivity.
13 In a general framework, Merton (1987) assumes this result and justifies his assumption by the fact that the
portfolios held by actual investors contain only a small fraction of the thousand of traded securities available. In our
setting, the result follows directly from the private information held by the traders.
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they will hold a long position, in the bad state they will sell the risky fund short14.
Overall, we are typically in a situation where each specialist’s information completely defines
the return distribution of the fund in which the corresponding trader invests and the private
information signals Ij , j = 1, . . . n, are mutually independent. Therefore, assumption 2 is fulfilled
and the condition to test for backtesting is just (4.13). Note moreover that assumption 1 is trivially
fulfilled for any p smaller than 1/2 since, given the private signals, the joint conditional probability
distribution of traders’ portfolio returns is normal.
5.2 Subadditivity Issues
Since assumptions 1 and 2 are fulfilled, we know from our general analysis above that the Rent-
a-Trader system ensures a coherent risk management. However, in the type of setting described
in the previous subsection, VaR may typically appear to violate subadditivity from the central
management point of view, even for very small levels of confidence probability p. To see this, let
us assume for simplicity that both traders have the same risk aversion γ and that their initial
wealth is normalized to one. We further assume that both information variables s1 and s2 are
in the good state (s1 = s2 = 0). Therefore, it follows that bθ11 = bθ22 = θ > 0, traders’ portfolios
are eR1 = (1− θ)Rf + θ eR1 and eR2 = (1− θ)Rf + θ eR2 and the aggregate portfolio at central
management level is eR1 + eR2 = 2 (1− θ)Rf + θ ³ eR1 + eR2´ .
In such a context, since the central management does not observe the private signals, it is
confronted with a mixture of normals for which subadditivity of VaR may be violated even at small
probability levels p :
Proposition 5.1: For any mixture probability values λ < 1/2, at the level p = p (λ, μ0, μ1) =
P
³ eR1 + eR2 ≤ μ1 + μ0´ we have
V aRp
³ eR1 + eR2´ > V aRp ³ eR1´+ V aRp ³ eR2´
14 In a framework with only two assets (a risk-free asset and a risky asset with the same unconditional expected
return), Sentana (2005) assumes and rationalizes the fact that the wealth invested in the risky asset is a linear
function of the information that the investor has on this asset.
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Moreover⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
p (λ, μ0, μ1) = λ
2Φ
¡
−μ/
√
2σ
¢
+ λ (1− λ) + (1− λ)2Φ (μ/2σ) −→
λ→0
μ→−∞
0
p (λ, μ0, μ1) −→μ→0 1
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function and μ ≡ μ1 − μ0 < 0.
Proof : see the Appendix.
In other words, the level p where violation of subadditivity occurs can be arbitrary close to λ
when the expected return spread between the good and the bad states is arbitrarily large. Therefore,
a small probability λ of occurrence of the bad state will produce a violation of subadditivity of VaR,
even for small levels of the confidence probability level p. We then get an example of the surprising
situation where subadditvity is violated even though decentralized risk management works, insofar
as traders remain true to the VaR requirements sent to them by central management.
5.3 Backtesting VaR requirements
In this simple model, a central unit can test condition (4.13), which can be written P [Xj ≤
−Sj |θk(Ik), k = 1, 2] ≤ p for all j, when the shares of the portfolios held by traders 1 and 2 are
known. It is important to realize that in this setting, knowing the portfolio composition of traders
1 and 2 is equivalent to knowing their private information s1 and s2. Indeed, if trader 1 takes a
long position in risky fund 1 it means that s1 is in the good state and inversely if he short-sells
fund 1. Similarly, the position of trader 2 will be fully revealing. We can write sj = 1{θjj<0}.
Since each private information completely defines the return distribution of the fund in which the
corresponding trader invests and given that the two informations s1 and s2 are independent, the
condition to test is exactly P [Xj ≤ −Sj |θj(sj) ] ≤ p for j = 1, 2.
By the conditional normality of the return distributions, central management needs only to
infer the means and variances in the good and bad states for each trader in order to test if each
trader obeys his VaR limit with probability p. In section 4, we assumed that central management
knew the underlying model. In practice, central management must estimate the model based on
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time series of returns and compute V aR conditionally on past returns. In this dynamic setting,
assumption A2 can be rewritten as:
V aRp [Xj |It, Iτ , τ ≤ t] ≤ V aRp [Xj |Ijt, Iτ , τ ≤ t] . (5.18)
In other words, we will assume that all past information becomes common knowledge. Propo-
sitions equivalent to Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 can be derived in a dynamic context. Engle and
Manganelli (2004) provide a useful framework to estimate value at risk in a dynamic context. They
remark that VaR is simply a particular quantile of future portfolio values, conditional on current
information. They provide a specification (CAViaR, Conditional Autoregressive Value at Risk)
for calculating V aRt as a function of variables known at time t − 1 (which in our case could be
the portfolio shares of the traders) and a set of parameters that are estimated using Koenker and
Bassett’s (1978) regression quantile framework.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that, in the context of decentralized portfolio management, central
management possesses only a fraction of information which belongs to each specialist. In such a
context, a distribution appears always thicker to the central unit than to the specialist. Therefore,
because of a lack of information, VaR may appear fallaciously non subadditive to the central
management unit. We were then able to show that decentralized portfolio management with a
VaR allocation to each specialist will work despite evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, we have
shown that value at risk remains subadditive in many situations of practical interest. In the case
of heavy-tail distributions, we have shown, at least for suﬃciently small probabilities, that VaR
remains subadditive when the possible loss has finite expectation. In this respect, non-subadditive
VaR remains quite an extreme situation.
Even though we show that for all practical purposes VaR is not as incoherent a measure of risk as
it is often argued, it remains that portfolio optimization practices using VaR as a simple substitute
to variance (i.e.maximization of expected return under a VaR constraint) may generate perverse
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eﬀects. In particular, there is a risk that a manager who is controlled only through a maximal
loss level with probability (1 − p) will be enticed to expose himself to huge possible losses with
probability p, as demonstrated by Basak and Shapiro (2001). To control for such a risk, one can
add to VaR the expected loss beyond the VaR or consider a parameterized family of more limited
possible risks. Alexander and Baptista (2004) compare VaR and conditional VaR constraints on
portfolio selection with a mean-variance model. Ortobelli, Rachev and Schwartz (2000) provide
a thorough analysis of optimal portfolio allocation with stable distributed returns, including with
a safety-first optimal allocation problem, whereby investors maximize their expected wealth while
minimizing at the same time the risk of loss. Eﬃcient frontiers in the latter case are a function of
the threshold VaR.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
To prove this proposition we need the following Lemma.
Lemma: For an increasing function g, statements ( a) and (b) below are equivalent
(a) g(u+ v) > g(u) + g(v) for all positive u and v,
(b) g−1(u+ v) < g−1(u) + g−1(v), for all positive u and v.
Proof of Lemma:
Suppose that (a) is true but (b) is not. So there exists positive u0 and v0 such that
g−1(u0 + v0) ≥ g−1(u0) + g−1(v0). Since g is increasing, we have:
g
¡
g−1(u0 + v0)
¢
≥ g
¡
g−1(u0) + g−1(v0)
¢ by (a)
> g
¡
g−1(u0)
¢
+ g
¡
g−1(v0)
¢
, that is u0 + v0 >
u0 + v0, an impossibility. Therefor, by contradiction (a) ⇒ (b) and similarly (b) ⇒ (a), and the
lemma follows.
For the proposition, we have:
g−1(
aX
p
) = Limp7−→0V aRp(X),
g−1(
aY
p
) = Limp7−→0V aRp(Y ),
g−1(
aX + aY
p
) = Limp7−→0V aRp(X + Y )
so, Limp7−→0 [V aRp(X + Y )− V aRp(X)− V aRp(Y )] = g−1(
aX + aY
p
)− g−1(aX
p
)− g−1(aY
p
).
(i) If for all positive u and v: g(u+ v) > g(u) + g(v), then g(
aX + aY
p
) > g(
aX
p
) + g(
aY
p
). This
implies
g−1(
aX + aY
p
) < g−1(
aX
p
) + g−1(
aY
p
). Therefore:
Limp7−→0 [V aRp(X + Y )− V aRp(X)− V aRp(Y )] < 0. So, there exists p0 ∈ ]0, 1] such that, for
any p ∈ ]0, p0[:
V aRp [X + Y ] < V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ).
(ii) If for all positive u and v: g(u+ v) < g(u)+ g(v), then g(
aX + aY
p
) < g(
aX
p
)+ g(
aY
p
). This
implies
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g−1(
aX + aY
p
) > g−1(
aX
p
) + g−1(
aY
p
). Therefore:
Limp7−→0 [V aRp(X + Y )− V aRp(X)− V aRp(Y )] > 0.So, there exists p0 ∈ ]0, 1] such that, for
any p ∈ ]0, p0[:
V aRp [X + Y ] < V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ),Q.E.D.
Measuring the Degree of Violation of Subadditivity:
We propose below a way to measure the degree of violation of subadditivity. While nonsubad-
ditivity means:
V aRp (X + Y ) > V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ), (6.19)
that is the loss of the portfolio (X + Y ) can exceed V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ) with probability p,
the question is with what probability kp, k ≥ 1, the loss of the portfolio (X + Y ) can exceed
V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ) with probability p, that is:
V aRkp(X + Y ) > (V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ). (6.20)
While violation (6.19) of subadditivity means that (6.20) is fulfilled with k = 1, it cannot be
fulfilled with k = 2 since, for any random variables X and Y :
V aR2p(X + Y ) ≤ V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ) (6.21)
Indeed:
P [X + Y ≤ −V aRp(X)− V aRp(Y )] ≤ 2p
P [X + Y ≤ −V aRp(X)− V aRp(Y )]
≤ P [X ≤ −V aRp(X)] + P [Y ≤ −V aRp(Y )] = 2p.
However, we can show for any k in ]0, 2[, there exists α0 in ]0, 1[ such that for any α in ]0, α0[,
for FX(x) ∼x−→−∞ aX [−x]−α, there exists p0 in ]0, 1[ such that for any p in ]0, p0[:
V aRkp(X + Y ) > V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y )
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As a function of α ∈ ]0, 1[, the function [σX + σY ]
α
σαX + σ
α
Y
is continuous and increasing, from the value
1/2 for α = 0 to the value 1 for α = 1. Then, for k given in ]0, 2[, there exists α0 such that, for any
α in ]0, α0[ :
[σX + σY ]
α
σαX + σ
α
Y
<
1
k
,
that is:
σX + σY < k−1/α [σαX + σ
α
Y ]
1/α = k−1/ασZ .
Since σX = lim
p→0
p1/αV aRp(X), σY = lim
p→0
p1/αV aRp(Y )
and σZ = lim
p→0
(kp)1/αV aRkp(z), we have the existence of p0 such that for any p in ]0, p0[:
p1/αV aRp(X) + p1/αV aRp(Y ) < k−1/α(kp)1/αV aRkp(Z)
that is V aRp(X) + V aRp(Y ) < V aRkp(Z).
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proposition 3.3. is a direct consequence of equation (3.11). Indeed, one can write:
E[(Y )n] = E{E[(Y )n | Z]} = E{km,n(Z){E[(Y )m | Z]} nm }
= E{km,n(Z)}E{{E[(Y )m | Z]} nm }+ Cov{km,n(Z), {E[(Y )m | Z]} nm }
with km,n(Z) =
E[(Y )n|Z]
{E[(Y )m|Z]} nm . Note that, since 0 < m < n, Jensen’s inequality gives:
E{{E[(Y )m | Z]} nm } ≥ {E{E[(Y )m | Z]}} nm = {E[(Y )m]} nm .
The inequality becomes strict as soon as the conditioning information Z is not independent from Y .
The spread widens when the information content of Z about Y increases. Therefore, we conclude
that, as soon as Z and Y are not independent:
E[(Y )n]
{E[(Y )m]} nm > E{km,n(Z)}+
Cov{km,n(Z), {E[(Y )m | Z]} nm }
E{km,n(Z)} (6.22)
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To prove Proposition 3.3, we simply note that, in the case of a scale mixture, km,n(Z) is a
constant equal to E[|u|
n]
{E[|u|m]} nm .
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
For A random event, we define the random variable:
1A =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if A occurs
0 otherwise.
Assumption A2 implies that:
1[Xj≤−V aRp(Xj |Ij )] ≤ 1[Xj≤−V aRp(Xj |I )].
But these two random variables have the same conditional expectation given Ij since by definition:
E
h
1[Xj≤−V aRp(Xj |Ij )] |Ij
i
= Pr {Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |Ij ) |Ij }
= p
and by the law of iterated expectations:
E
h
1[Xj≤−V aRp(Xj |I )] |Ij
i
= E
h
E
h
1[Xj≤−V aRp(Xj |I )] |I
i
|Ij
i
= E [Pr {Xj ≤ −V aRp(Xj |I ) |I } |Ij ]
= E [p |Ij ]
= p
Therefore, these two random variables must coincide Ij almost surely. This achieves the proof
of proposition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Since for all j, V aRp (Xj |Ij ) ≤ Sj and, by assumption A2:
V aRp (Xj |I ) ≤ V aRp (Xj |Ij )
we have:
p(I) = P
⎡
⎣
nX
j=1
Xj ≤ −
nX
j=1
Sj |I
⎤
⎦ ≤ P
⎡
⎣
nX
j=1
Xj ≤ −
nX
j=1
V aRp(Xj |I ) |I
⎤
⎦
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But, by assumption A1:
V aRp
⎛
⎝
nX
j=1
Xj |I
⎞
⎠ ≤
nX
j=1
V aRp(Xj |I ).
Thus:
p(I) ≤ P
"
nP
j=1
Xj ≤ −V aRp(
nP
j=1
Xj |I ) |I
#
= p.
Since this inequality is identically true, for all possible values of the random information set I, we
conclude by considering unconditional expectations that:
P
⎡
⎣
nX
j=1
Xj ≤ −
nX
j=1
Sj
⎤
⎦ ≤ p.
A fortiori:
P
⎡
⎣
nX
j=1
Xj ≤ −V aR∗p
⎤
⎦ ≤ p
Proof of Proposition 5.1:
Let us define the following variables
X1 ≡ R11 − μ0 ∼ N
¡
μ, σ2
¢
X2 ≡ R12 − μ0 ∼ N
¡
μ, σ2
¢
Z ≡ R0 − μ0 ∼ N
¡
0, σ2
¢
we have
eR1 = s1X1 + (1− s1)Z + μ0eR2 = s2X2 + (1− s2)Z + μ0
and
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p = P
h eR1 + eR2 ≤ μ1 + μ0i
= P [s1X1 + (1− s1)Z + s2X2 + (1− s2)Z ≤ μ1 − μ0]
= P [s1s2 (X1 +X2) + s1 (1− s2) (X1 + Z)+
+ s2 (1− s1) (X2 + Z) + 2 (1− s1) (1− s2)Z ≤ μ]
= λ2FX1+X2 (μ) + λ (1− λ)FX1+Z (μ) + λ (1− λ)FX2+Z (μ) + (1− λ)2 F2Z (μ)
= λ2FX1+X2 (μ) + λ (1− λ) + (1− λ)2 F2Z (μ)
i.e. p = λ2Φ
¡
−μ/
√
2σ
¢
+ λ (1− λ) + (1− λ)2Φ (μ/2σ)
Let us define
U1 ≡ s1X1 + (1− s1)Z
U2 ≡ s2X2 + (1− s2)Z
We can see that Uj = eRj−μ0, j = 1, 2. Therefore the proposition is equivalent to V aRp (U1 + U2) >
V aRp (U1)+ V aRp (U2). By definition of p, we have V aRp (U1 + U2) = −μ, and since U1 d= U2 then
V aRp (U1) = V aRp (U2) and the problem becomes V aRp (U1 + U2) > 2V aRp (U1) i.e. V aRp (U1) <
−μ/2 or equivalently Pr (U1 ≤ μ/2) < p.
Therefore, we have:
P (U1 ≤ μ/2) = P [s1X1 + (1− s1)Z ≤ μ/2]
= λFX1 (μ/2) + (1− λ)FZ (μ/2)
i.e. P (U1 ≤ μ/2) = λΦ (−μ/2σ) + (1− λ)Φ (μ/2σ)
so
p− P (U1 ≤ μ/2) = λ2
£
Φ
¡
−μ/
√
2σ
¢
+Φ (μ/2σ)− 1
¤
> 0
since Φ
¡
−μ/
√
2σ
¢
> Φ (−μ/2σ) and Φ (−μ/2σ) + Φ (μ/2σ) = 1
i.e. P (U1 ≤ μ/2) < p, and the proposition follows. Q.E.D
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Conclusion générale
Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, en établissant un lien entre la corrélation extrême et
la dépendance des queues nous avons montré, que les modèles de changement de régime et GARCH
classiques reproduisent partiellement ou ne reproduisent pas du tout l’asymétrie observée dans la
dépendance. Nous avons alors proposé un modèle basé sur les copules qui permet de prendre en
compte cette asymétrie. Au moyen de ces outils, nous avons pu construire un modèle à quatre vari-
ables, qui nous a permis non seulement d’analyser le comportement de la corrélation mais aussi la
dépendance dans les queues. Ce modèle nous a permis d’analyser le comportement des rendements
des actions et des obligations sur les marchés internationaux, notamment entre le Canada et les
Etats-Unis d’une part, la France et l’Allemagne d’autre part. Les résultats empiriques ont révélé
une plus forte dépendance internationale entre les actifs du même type par rapport à la dépen-
dance entre les obligations et les actions même lorsqu’on considère le même pays. D’autre part,
nous avons mis en exergue une relation entre la volatilité du taux d’échange et l’asymétrie dans
la dépendance. Ainsi, la dépendance entre la France et l’Allemagne s’est révélée très asymétrique
avant l’introduction de la monnaie unique européenne (Euro), alors que cette asymétrie a consid-
érablement diminué après l’introduction de cette monnaie.
Ce modèle nous a permis d’apporter un élément d’explication additionnelle aux phénomènes
de la faible diversification internationale et la tendance des investisseurs à se rabattre sur les actifs
moins risqués comme les obligations au détriment des actions. L’intuition derrière cette explication
est qu’en présence d’une forte dépendance dans les moments de baisse sur les marchés, les bénéfices
liés à la diversification diminuent du fait que l’eﬀet de la diversification s’estompe au moment ou
les investisseurs en ont le plus besoin.
Dans le second chapitre, nous avons montrer que lorsque cette asymétrie n’est pas prise en
compte dans un modèle et que la loi Gaussienne est utilisée comme c’est souvent le cas dans la
pratique, les mesures de risques extrêmes telles que la VaR et la ES sont sous-estimées. Nous
nous sommes rendu compte que bien que le cadre général du DCC estime assez bien la VaR au
niveau 5% pour toutes les structures de dépendance, il sous-estime cette mesure pour des niveau
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beaucoup plus prudentiels (1%, 0.5%) lorsque l’asymétrie présente dans les données n’est pas prise
en compte. Le fait que les modèles de dépendance asymétrique comme la Gaussienne et la t de
Student sous-estiment l’ES au niveau 5%, bien qu’ils aient donné plutôt une bonne estimation
de la VaR à ce même niveau de couverture est apparu comme un résultat inattendu bien que
explicable. Une explication peu être liée au fait que si ces distributions génèrent des portefeuilles
avec des queues moins épaisses qu’elles devraient l’être, alors elles auraient tendance à sous-estimer
la moyenne dans les queues. La copule de Gumbel qui prend en compte l’asymétrie observée dans
la structure de dépendance s’est révélée supérieure dans la précision de l’estimation des mesures de
risques extrêmes en situation de dépendance asymétrique.
Dans le troisième chapitre, le problème de la cohérence de la VaR comme mesure de risque
a été abordé. L’idée clef de notre démarche a été que si l’épaisseur des queues de distributions
est responsable de la violation de la sous-additivité, une utilisation appropriée de l’information
conditionnelle pourrait rendre la VaR plus rationnelle pour la gestion décentralisée du risque. Trois
arguments soutiennent cette demarche. Premièrement, partant du fait que les traders possèdent
sur leur segment de marché une information dite privée plus riche que le gestionnaire central,
Ils doivent simplement respecter les contraintes prudentielles imposées par celui-ci pour que le
contrôle de la VaR décentralisée fonctionne de façon cohérente. Nous avons montré par la suite,
que dans ce contexte de décentralisation, si le gestionnaire central a accès ex-post à la composition
du portefeuille des traders individuels, il pourra récupérer une bonne part de leur information
privée. Finalement, en utilisant les distributions à queues épaisses telles que les lois stables et
les lois de type Pareto, nous avons montré que l’épaisseur exigée des queues pour violer la sous-
additivité même pour les petits niveaux de probabilités, induit une situation tellement extrême
qu’elle correspond à une information tellement faible que la perte espérée est infinie. Nous concluons
dont que l’incohérence de la gestion décentralisée par la VaR caractérisée par l’absence de sous-
additivité avec une information assez riche, est une exception et non une règle, d’autant plus que
dans la pratique, la moyenne conditionnelle ou inconditionnelle est en général supposée finie.
